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I. INTRODUCTION
Calls for self-regulation of electronic media have recently been heard
in Washington, D.C. In December 1998, a Presidential Advisory Commit-
tee recommended that digital television broadcasters adopt a voluntary
Code of Conduct highlighting their public interest commitments.' The Ad-
visory Committee Report even included a "Model Voluntary Code"
.2drafted by a subcommittee headed by Professor Cass Sunstein.
Similarly, President Clinton has called for industry self-regulation to
address consumer privacy concerns on the Internet.3 This theme has been
1. NTIA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, FINAL REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION
BROADCASTERS 46 (1998), available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.
pdf> [hereinafter PIAC REPORT]. As described in this Report, "[d]igital television is a new
technology for transmitting and receiving broadcast television signals. It delivers better
pictures and sound, uses the broadcast spectrum more efficiently, and adds versatility to the
range of applications." Id. at xi. The Advisory Committee was charged with developing
recommendations concerning public interest obligations to be imposed on television sta-
tions as they convert to digital television. Exec. Order No. 13,038, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,063
(1997). It consisted of 22 members representing both the broadcast industry and the public.
See NTIA, Advisory Committee on Public Interest: Obligations of Digital Television
Broadcasters (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/pubint.htm>.
The Advisory Committee met over a period of 15 months. The topic of self-regulation was
discussed at the Advisory Committee meetings held on June 8, 1998, and September 9,
1998. Transcripts of these meetings may be found at
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom>.
2. PIAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 106-26.
3. PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE, JR., A
FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 18 (1997).
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echoed by the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA)4 and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC).5 However, the FTC released a report in June 1998, finding that
self-regulation had not been successful thus far in protecting consumer
privacy.6 It recommended congressional action specifically to address the
issue of children's privacy online, while giving more time to industry to
prove it can regulate itself before calling for general privacy legislation.
In the last few days of the 1998 session, Congress in fact passed leg-
islation designed to protect the privacy of children online. Yet, the regula-
tory scheme established by this legislation contains specific incentives for
industry to self-regulate.8
Why are the Advisory Committee, the Clinton Administration, and
the FTC all calling for self-regulation? It is most likely that they see self-
regulation as superior to (or at least more politically acceptable than) gov-
ernment regulation. Many scholars have also touted the benefits of self-
regulation, but self-regulation is not without its critics.
The Administration supports private sector efforts now underway to imple-
ment meaningful, consumer-friendly, self-regulatory privacy regimes. These in-
clude mechanisms for facilitating awareness and the exercise of choice online,
evaluating private sector adoption of and adherence to fair information practices,
and dispute resolution.
... If privacy concerns are not addressed by industry through self-regulation
and technology, the Administration will face increasing pressure to play a more
direct role in safeguarding consumer choice regarding privacy online.
Id.
4. Elements of Effective Self Regulation for the Protection of Privacy and Questions
Related to Online Privacy, Notice and Request for Public Comment, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,729
(NTIA 1998).
5. See, e.g., FIC, PRiVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS i-ii (1998) (noting that
the FTC's "goal has been to encourage and facilitate effective self-regulation as the pre-
ferred approach to protecting consumer privacy online") [hereinafter PRIvACY REPORT].
6. Id. at 41.
7. Id. at 42. See also Electronic Commerce: Hearings on H.R. 2368 Before the Sub-
comm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 105th Cong. 307 (1998) [hereinafter Electronic Commerce Hearings]
(statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC).
8. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1301-
1308, 112 Stat. 2681, 2728-35 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506). Section 1303
directs the FTC to promulgate regulations that generally require commercial Web site op-
erators to give notice and obtain consent from the parent of a child under the age of 13 be-
fore collecting personally identifiable information from the child. Section 1304 directs the
FTC to "provide incentives for self-regulation" by offering a "safe harbor" from prosecu-
tion for companies that comply with self-regulatory guidelines issued by industry that have
been found, after notice and comment, by the FTC to meet the requirements of the law. See
also Electronic Commerce Hearings, supra note 7, at 309-10 (statement of Robert Pitofsky,
Chairman, FTC) (describing how a safe harbor would work).
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Part II of this Article reviews the literature on self-regulation to de-
fine what is meant by the term, to identify the purported advantages and
disadvantages of self-regulation, and to identify the conditions needed for
its success. Part III examines situations involving media where self-
regulation has been utilized to determine why it was undertaken and
whether is has been successful.9 Based on these examples, Part IV suggests
some tentative conclusions about the circumstances under which self-
regulation works. Finally, it applies these findings to recent proposals to
utilize self-regulation in connection with digital television and privacy on
the Internet.
II. SELF-REGULATION
A. The Definition of Self-Regulation
The term self-regulation means different things to different people. In
introducing a collection of papers analyzing the prospects of self-
regulation for protecting privacy on the Internet, Assistant Secretary of
Commerce Larry Irving observed:
Most basically, we need to define what we mean, as the term "self-
regulation" itself has a range of definitions. At one end of the spec-
trum, the term is used quite narrowly, to refer only to those instances
where the government has formally delegated the power to regulate, as
in the delegation of securities industry oversight to the stock ex-
changes. At the other end of the spectrum, the term is used when the
private sector perceives the need to regulate itself for whatever rea-
son-to respond to consumer demand, to carry out its ethical beliefs,
to enhance industry reputation, or to level the market playing field-
and does so.10
To devise a definition for purposes of this Article, it is useful to break
apart the term "self-regulation." The word "self' refers to the actor. It
could mean a single company. More commonly, however, and for pur-
poses of this Article, it is used to refer to a group of companies acting col-
lectively, for example, through a trade association." The word "regulation"
refers to what the actor is doing. Regulation has three components: (1)
9. In analyzing success, the Author primarily considers whether self-regulatory codes
have been successful in achieving their stated purposes. The separate, but important ques-
tion of whether the stated purposes are in the public interest is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle.
10. Larry Irving, Introduction to PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION
AGE (NTIA 1997), available at <http:/www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/privacy-pt.htm>.
11. Other writers may define self-regulatory activities more broadly. See, e.g., Everette
E. Dennis, Internal Examination: Self-Regulation and the American Media, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 697 (1995) (including public opinion and media critics in survey of self-
regulatory efforts of print media).
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legislation, that is, defining appropriate rules; (2) enforcement, such as
initiating actions against violators; and (3) adjudication, that is, deciding
whether a violation has taken place and imposing an appropriate sanction.
12
Thus, the term "self-regulation" means that the industry or profession
rather than the government is doing the regulation. However, it is not nec-
essarily the case that government involvement is entirely lacking.13 Instead
of taking over all three components of regulation, industry may be in-
volved in only one or two. For example, an industry may be involved at the
legislation stage by developing a code of practice, while leaving enforce-
ment to the government, or the government may establish regulations, but
delegate enforcement to the private sector. Sometimes government will
mandate that an industry adopt and enforce a code of self-regulation. 4 Of-
ten times, an industry will engage in self-regulation in an attempt to stave
off government regulation. Alternatively, self-regulation may be under-
taken to implement or supplement legislation.
1 5
B. Arguments in Favor of Self-Regulation
The claimed advantages of self-regulation over governmental regula-
tion include efficiency, increased flexibility, increased incentives for com-
pliance, and reduced cost. For example, it is argued that industry partici-
pants are likely to have "superior knowledge of the subject compared to [a]
government agency."' 16 Therefore, it is more efficient for government to
12. Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the
Protection of Personal Information, in PRIvACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE, supra note 10, at 9.
13. But see Robert Corn-Revere, Self-Regulation and the Public Interest, in DIGrrAL
BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: REPORTS AND PAPERS OF THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY PROGRAM 63 (Charles M. Firestone & Amy Korzick
Garmer eds., 1998), available at <http://www.aspeninst.orgldir/polpro/CSP/DBPI/dbpil4.
html> (arguing that self-regulation is best promoted by ending all direct and indirect gov-
ernment content control and that efforts to promote government policies by means of threat,
indirect pressure, or suggested industry codes are not true self-regulation).
14. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRATHwArrE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 103 (1992) (viewing self-regulation as a form of subcontracting
regulatory functions to private actors). In some countries, laws require industries to adopt
codes of practice. For example, Australia requires broadcasting industry groups to develop
codes of practice, in consultation with the regulatory authority, concerning such topics as
preventing the broadcast of unsuitable programs, promoting accuracy and fairness in news
and current affairs, and protecting children from harmful program material. Broadcasting
Services Act, 1992, § 123 (Austl.).
15. Frank Kuitenbrouwer, Self-Regulation: Some Dutch Experiences, in PRIVACY AND
SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 10, at 113.
16. Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regula-
tory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 181-82 (1995); AYRES & BRAITHWAMIE, supra note
14, at 110-12.
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rely on the industry's collective expertise than to reproduce it at the agency
level. This factor may be particularly important where technical knowl-
edge is needed to develop appropriate rules and determine whether they
have been violated.
Second, it is argued that self-regulation is more flexible than gov-
ernment regulation. 17 It is easier for a trade association to modify rules in
response to changing circumstances than for a government agency to
amend its rules. Not only are government agencies bound to follow the
notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, but it
is often difficult for an agency to obtain the political support and consen-
sus needed to act. It is argued that industry is better able to determine
when a rule may be changed to result in better compliance. Moreover, self-
regulation can be more tailored to the particular industry than government
regulation. While "command and control" regulation may have worked
well in the past when addressing near monopolies, it does not work well
with different types of market failures.18 Given the sheer magnitude of in-
dividual problems, general rules may lead to absurd results.
Another argument in support of self-regulation is that it provides
greater incentives for compliance.' 9 It is thought that if rules are developed
by the industry, industry participants are more likely to perceive them as
reasonable. Companies may be more willing to comply with rules devel-
oped by their peers rather than those coming from the outside.20
Fourth, it is argued that self-regulation is less costly to the govern-
ment because it shifts the cost of developing and enforcing rules to the in-
dustry.2' Of course, the government may still be involved in supervision,
but supervision requires fewer resources than direct regulation. Indeed, Ian
Ayres and John Braithwaite argue that self-regulation is an attractive alter-
native to direct government regulation because the state "cannot afford to
do an adequate job on its own." They acknowledge, however, that self-
regulation will only result in a net reduction of cost if the costs to industry
are lower than the government's cost savings.
23
17. Michael, supra note 16, at 181-82; AYREs & BRArrHwArrE, supra note 14, at 110-
12.
18. Michael, supra note 16, at 186-88.
19. Id. at 181, 183-84; AYRES & BRArrHwArT, supra note 14, at 115.
20. Swire, supra note 12, at 4; AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 14, at 115-16.
21. See, e.g., Michael, supra note 16, at 184; AYRES & BRATHwArrE, supra note 14, at
114.
22. AYRES & BRArrHWArrE, supra note 14, at 103.
23. Id. at 120-21. If industry expertise is important, it may be the case that the costs to
industry are lower.
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Self-regulation may also be justified where the rules or adjudicatory
procedures differ from the surrounding community or the rules of the sur-
rounding community are inapplicable. Specifically, the argument is some-
times made with respect to the Internet, where jurisdictional and sover-
eignty issues make it difficult for nations to enforce their laws.24
Finally, self-regulation may be used instead of governmental regula-
tion to avoid constitutional issues. 8 For example, it is doubtful under the
First Amendment whether government can prohibit the advertising of al-
coholic beverages.26 However, no constitutional question arises if a station
or group of stations independently decides not to accept alcohol advertis-
ing.
C. Arguments Against Self-Regulation
Critics of self-regulation question the basis for the arguments in favor
of self-regulation. For example, while acknowledging that industry may
possess greater technical expertise than government, Professor Peter Swire
questions whether companies will use that expertise to the benefit of the
public, suggesting instead that they are more likely to employ their exper-
tise to maximize the industry's profits. Similarly, the idea that industry
will comply more willingly with its own regulations than those imposed
from the outside seems somewhat weak where industry is actively in-
volved in developing regulations at the agency.
Other criticisms are directed against self-regulation itself. Leaving
regulation to the industry creates the possibility that industry may subvert
regulatory goals to its own business goals; or as one article put it, "self-
regulators often combine-and sometimes confuse-self-regulation with
self-service."29 Self-regulatory groups may be more subject to industry
24. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-the Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370-76 (1996).
25. See generally Duncan A. MacDonald, Privacy, Self-Regulation, and the Contrac-
tual Model: A Report from Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., in PRIVACY AND SELF-
REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 10, at 133, 134 (arguing that self-
regulatory measures can avoid constitutional issues arising under the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments).
26. See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
27. Swire, supra note 12, at 13.
28. In the Author's experience in rule makings at the FCC, industry tends to dominate
the process. An alternative process that may offer similar opportunities for industry in-
volvement and commitment to regulations is the negotiated rulemaking process.
29. Donald I. Baker & W. Todd Miller, Privacy, Antitrust and the National Informa-
tion Infrastructure: Is Self-Regulation of Telecommunications-Related Personal Informa-
tion a Workable Tool?, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra
note 10, at 93-94.
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pressure than government agencies. Moreover, the private nature of self-
regulation may fail to give adequate attention to the needs of the public or
the views of affected parties outside the industry.
Many question the adequacy of enforcement in self-regulatory re-
gimes.30 Industry may be unwilling to commit the resources needed for
vigorous self-enforcement.3 It is also unclear whether industry has the
power to enforce adequate sanctions. At most, a trade association may
punish noncompliance with expulsion. Whether expulsion is an effective
deterrent depends on whether the benefits of membership are important.
2
In many cases, expulsion or other sanctions, such as denial of the right to
display a seal, are insufficient.33
Without adequate incentives to comply, "bad actors" will be unlikely
to comply, and the "good actors" that do comply will be placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage. 34 Where a company can make greater profit by ig-
noring self-regulation than complying, it is likely to do so, especially
where noncompliance is not easily detected by the consumer or likely to
harm the particular company's reputation. 35 Like cartels, self-regulatory
frameworks may unravel because of cheaters.36 On the other hand, when
enforcement actions are taken, concerns are raised about the exercise of
unreviewable discretion.
37
Another problem with self-regulation is that it can facilitate anticom-
petitive conduct.38 Self-regulation, as that term is used in this Article, in-
30. See, e.g., Michael, supra note 16, at 189; Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for
Consumer Transactions in Electronic Commerce: Why Self-Regulation Is Inadequate, 49
S.C. L. REv. 847, 874-77 (1998); Deidre K. Mulligan & Janlori Goldman, The Limits and
the Necessity of Self-Regulation: The Case for Both, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN
THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 10, at 67-68.
31. Stephen Balkan, Content Ratings for the Internet and Recreational Software, in
PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 10, at 145 (pointing
out that self-regulation requires considerable effort, time, resources, good judgment, and
honesty).
32. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Regulatory Models for Protecting Privacy in the Internet, in
PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 10, at 110.
33. Such sanctions may be ineffective where consumers lack the knowledge of how a
company is viewed by its peers. Moreover, trade associations generally are reluctant to ex-
pel their members, especially when the members pay dues to support the association's ac-
tivities.
34. Electronic Commerce Hearings, supra note 7, at 356 (testimony of Kathryn Mont-
gomery, President, Center for Media Education).
35. Swire, supra note 12, at 6.
36. Perritt, supra note 32, at 109-10.
37. Michael, supra note 16, at 190; AYREs & BRArrHWArrE, supra note 14, at 124-25.
38. See, e.g., Baker & Miller, supra note 29, at 93; Joseph Kattan & Carl Shapiro, Pri-
vacy, Self-Regulation, and Antitrust, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE, supra note 10, at 99.
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volves competitors getting together to agree on how they will conduct their
business. As one article points out, this type of agreement inherently raises
antitrust issues, and agreements by professional organizations have some-
times been challenged by the government under antitrust laws.39
D. Conditions for Successful Use of Self-Regulation
Professor Douglas C. Michael has surveyed the use of "audited self-
regulation" by federal agencies.40 This term refers to the delegation of
power to implement laws or agency regulations to a nongovernmental en-
tity where the federal agency is involved in verifying the soundness of
rules, checking compliance, and spot-checking the accuracy of information
supplied to it. Although audited self-regulation is somewhat more narrow
than the examples of self-regulation discussed below, Michael's observa-
tions about the conditions for successful self-regulation might have
broader application. Michael reviewed the literature and hypothesized that
audited self-regulation would work best where certain conditions were
met:
First, the private entity to which self-regulatory authority is granted
must have both the expertise and motivation to perform the delegated
task. Second, the agency staff must possess the expertise to "audif' the
self-regulatory activity, which includes independent plenary authority
to enforce rules or to review decisions of the delegated authority.
Third, the statute must consist of relatively narrow rules related output-
based standards.... Finally, the agency's and delegated authority's
decision must observe rules for notice, hearing, impartiality, and writ-
ten records of proceedings and decisions.
Michael examined twelve different self-regulatory programs of seven
different agencies in the areas of financial institutions, services and prod-
ucts, government benefit programs, nuclear power, and agricultural mar-
keting.42 His survey confirmed the importance of the industry organization
having both expertise and the incentive to self-regulate.43 Where industry
expertise and incentives were missing, self-regulatory programs were
abandoned or modified." However, it was not essential to have a preexist-
ing industry organization; rather, "successful regulatory organizations
[could] be established contemporaneously with the regulation."45 The lack
39. Kattan & Shapiro, supra note 38, at 99.
40. Michael, supra note 16.
41. Id. at 192.
42. Id. at 203-41. Some of these programs were successful, while others were not.
43. Id. at 241.
44. Id. at 242.
45. Id. at 241-42.
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of agency expertise also turned out not to be an obstacle because agencies
were able to develop the required expertise.46 Confirming his third hy-
pothesis, he found that the programs with the most subjective standards
experienced the most difficulty in implementation.4 ' Finally, he found that
self-regulatory programs failed where procedural fairness, through such
means as rule making on the record with notice and opportunity for com-
ment from all affected groups, was lacking.48
IlI. USE OF SELF-REGULATION BY THE MEDIA
Self-regulation has been tried since the earliest days of electronic
media, beginning with radio in the 1920s. The National Association of
Broadcasters' (NAB) Radio Code existed for over fifty years, while the
Television Code was in effect for about thirty years. Advertisers also have
their own codes applicable to broadcast advertising. Examples of the latter
include the Guidelines of the Children's Advertising Review Unit (CARU)
and the Code of Practice of the Distilled Spirits Industry (DISCUS). Self-
regulation has been employed with respect to news reporting, comic
books, motion pictures, video games, and the Internet as well. This Part
examines several of these examples of self-regulation. It focuses primarily
on the experience with the NAB Code and the CARU Guidelines since
they are most closely related to the proposals to use self-regulation for
digital television (DTV) and privacy on the Internet.
A. The NAB Code
The NAB's efforts at self-regulation date back to its beginnings.
Founded in 1923, 49 the NAB sought to address the problem of interference
by asking radio stations to operate voluntarily only on their assigned
wavelengths at assigned hours. 50 This effort failed, however, because too
many stations refused to go along. As one commentator notes, "[t]he
problem was enforcement of a self-regulatory plan in a circumstance
where the natural incentives to break the rules were overwhelming. It
might be in the industry's best interest for a particular broadcaster to leave
the airwaves, but why would any particular broadcaster voluntarily do
46. Id. at 242.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 245.
49. The NAB was formed originally in an attempt to resolve disputes over copyright
issues between broadcasters and the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Pub-
lishers (ASCAP). David R. Mackey, The Development of the National Association of
Broadcasters, 1 J. BRDCST. 307, 307 (1957).
50. Mark M. MacCarthy, Broadcast Self-Regulation: The NAB Codes, Family Viewing
Hour, and Television Violence, 13 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 668-69 (1995).
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this?" 5' The recognition that self-regulation was not working to eliminate
the chaos on the airwaves was one of the factors leading to the passage of
the Radio Act of 1927.52
1. Radio Code
Passage of the 1927 Radio Act made clear that if broadcasters failed
to control their activities, the government would do it for them. 3 So, after
more than a year of discussion and drafting, the NAB adopted its first Ra-
dio Code in 1929. It contained two sections-a code of ethics and stan-
dards of commercial practices. However, it lacked any enforcement provi-
sions. Once the document was passed, it was largely forgotten.,4
In 1933, the NAB submitted the Radio Code to the National Recov-
ery Administration, and it was signed by President Roosevelt. This had the
effect of turning the voluntary code into a federal law with a federally ap-
pointed authority to supervise compliance.5 However, in 1935, the Su-
preme Court found such codes unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States.5 The NAB thereafter adopted a voluntary code that was,
according to one commentator, "placed... in an obscure office file.., not
to be dusted off again until 1939." 57 In that year, the Code was amended in
response to strong criticism of the industry to make it more specific and to
58
create an enforcement group called the Compliance Committee.
For the first time, the Code was enforced. A provision that prohibited
the sale of time for the airing of controversial views was applied to stations
that sold time to the popular anticommunist, anticapitalist, anti-Semitic
demagogue Father Charles E. Coughlin. Enough stations complied with
the NAB Code that Father Coughlin found it difficult to find outlets and
51. Id. at 669.
52. Id.; Mackey, supra note 49, at 320-21.
53. BRUCE A. LINTroN, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING 12 (1967). See also Lynda
M. Maddox & Eric J. Zanot, Suspension of the NAB Code and Its Effect on the Regulation
of Advertising, 61 JOURNALISM Q. 125, 126 (1984) (noting that after the Federal Radio
Commission called for regulation of the amount and character of advertising, the NAB
adopted the Radio Code calling for the voluntary elimination of all commercials between 7
P.M. and 11 P.M.).
54. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING, supra note 53, at 12.
55. Id.
56. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
57. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING, supra note 53, at 13.
58. Id. These changes were adopted in part to respond to the perception that the FCC
was prepared to regulate content in wake of the broadcast of War of the Worlds. MacCarthy,
supra note 50, at 672. Among other things, the 1938 Code called for close supervision of
children's programs, required fair discussion of controversial issues, banned the sale of time
for controversial issues, required news to be fair and accurate, limited the amount and type
of commercials, and prohibited advertising of hard liquor and fortune telling. Id. at 672-73.
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eventually went off the air in 1940.9 A few years later, the NAB revised
the Code to conform to a Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) ruling that airtime should be sold for the airing of controver-
sial views 6° and made it clear that the Code provisions were meant merely
61to guide broadcasters and would not be enforced.
2. Television Code
The first Television Code was adopted at the end of 1951.62 Based on
both the Radio Code and the Motion Picture Code, it was drafted to head
off proposed legislation that would have created a citizens advisory board
for radio and television. 64
The Television Code was amended at various points.65 It probably
had its greatest effect in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1961, the NAB expanded
its budget and staff to include an overall Code Authority Director for both
the Television and Radio Codes.6 Writing in 1967, Professor Bruce Linton
describes the activities of the Code Authority. 67 One function was to inter-
pret the Code by providing advice, publishing guidelines and amendments
to clarify Code provisions, and issuing rulings on specific programs or
commercials. He notes that most cases were brought to successful conclu-
sion through negotiation rather than issuing a ruling. Most of the daily
work of the Code staff concerned commercials rather than program con-
tent.69
59. MacCarthy, supra note 50, at 673.
60. United Brdcst. Co., Decision and Order, 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
61. MacCarthy, supra note 50, at 673; LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING,
supra note 53, at 13-14.
62. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING, supra note 53, at 15-16; MacCarthy,
supra note 50, at 674.
63. The Motion Picture Code is discussed infra Part III.C.4.
64. MacCarthy, supra note 50, at 674 (describing Senator William Benton's bill to es-
tablish a National Citizens Advisory Board for Radio and Television to oversee program-
ming and to submit a yearly report to Congress on the extent to which broadcasting served
the public interest). Brenner attributes the Television Code "partly as a reaction to congres-
sional ire over hard liquor advertisements on TV." Daniel Brenner, Note, The Limits of
Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the First Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1527, 1529
(1975). See also Liquor Advertising over Radio and Television: Hearings on S. 2444 Before
the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong. 227-28 (1952).
65. In the 1950s, changes were made in the aftermath of the quiz show scandals. Mac-
Carthy, supra note 50, at 675.
66. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING, supra note 53, at 18.
67. Id. at 34-46.
68. In 1966, for example, the New York Code Office dealt with 115 advertising agen-
cies and acted on over 1,640 commercials for over 800 different products. Id. at 37.
69. LNrrON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING, supra note 53, at 39.
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Another function of the Code Authority was that of enforcement.
Linton notes that there were
two areas of compliance involved-one with the [advertising] agencies
and producers, and the other with the Code subscribers. The agencies
and producers must comply with Code rulings or risk not having their
material scheduled on Code stations. The Code subscribers must con-
form to the Code and comply with Code rulings or run the risk of los-
ing the Code Seal and Code membership.
70
He found a "considerable amount of 'due process"' for advertisers. All
negotiations were confidential unless a finding of noncompliance was
made. While confidentiality protected advertisers from criticism, it also
"serve[d] to mask from the public any real appreciation of the work of the
Code Authority."
72
Linton observed that determining whether stations were in compli-
ance with the NAB Code was "a fantastically difficult job. 73 Compliance
was checked through a system of twice-per-year monitoring backed up by
letters of complaint, which came mostly from competing stations. The only
sanction for violation was the revocation of subscription, which meant that
the station no longer had the right to display the Seal of Good Practice. He
noted that the process for removal was "complex and full of 'due proc-
ess."'
74
Writing in the mid-1970s, Daniel Brenner provides a similar account
of the Code administration bureaucracy. 75 The Code Authority handled the
76Code's day-to-day operations. The Code Authority had three offices-
one each in New York, Hollywood, and Washington, D.C.77 It was in-
volved in "clearing every new network series and individual controversial
episodes, consulting with advertising agencies and independent program
producers on standards of taste, evaluating commercials for Code compli-
ance, receiving complaints, and monitoring subscribers. 78 The Code
Authority even published Code News, a monthly newsletter.
79
70. Id. at 40. Other functions of the Code Authority included acting as a liaison with
government and other organizations and publicizing the Code's work. Id. at 43-46.
71. Id. at40.
72. Id. at 41.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 42.
75. This description of the Code enforcement bureaucracy is from Brenner, supra note
64, at 1530-33.
76. 1a at 1530.
77. Id. at 1531 n.20.
78. Id. at 1530 n.15.
79. Id. at 1531 n.20.
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Decisions of the Code Authority were reviewed by the Television
Code Review Board. This Board consisted of nine members representing
subscribing stations, including one member for each of three major net-
works.8s It reported directly to the Television Board of Directors at the
NAB. The Television Code Review Board also considered revisions to the
Code.2
Both the Radio and Television Codes were repealed after the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against the NAB alleging that the ad-
vertising provisions of the Code violated the antitrust laws.83 The DOJ ar-
gued that provisions limiting the number of minutes per hour of
commercials, the number of commercials per hour, and the number of
products advertised in a commercial, had the actual purpose and effect of
manipulating the supply of commercial television time, with the result that
the price of the time was raised to advertisers in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 4 After the district court granted partial summary judg-
ment for the DOJ, the NAB entered into a consent decree in which the
NAB agreed to cease enforcing the advertising guidelines.85 Although only
certain advertising provisions had been challenged, the NAB abandoned
86the Code in its entirety in January 1983.
At the time the NAB decided to abandon the Code, it had become
clear that the FCC, then under Republican Chairman Mark Fowler, was
abandoning the public trustee concept and dismantling the system of
broadcast regulation that had grown up around it." In 1981, the FCC had
"deregulated" radio by repealing ascertainment requirements, 88 repealing
80. Id. at 1530.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. United States v. NAB, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982).
84. The NAB argued that the limits were voluntary guidelines enacted in the public
interest. See Patricia Brosterhous, United States v. National Association of Broadcasters:
The Deregulation of Self-Regulation, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 313 (1983).
85. United States v. NAB, Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact State-
ment, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,810 (DOJ 1982).
86. A few years after the Code was eliminated, Professor Linton found that each of the
three major networks had adopted parts of the NAB Code, which were implemented
through the networks' Standards and Practices Divisions. He found that the absence of the
Code had the greatest impact at the station level. Bruce A. Linton, Self-Regulation in
Broadcasting Revisited, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 483 (1987).
87. Instead of treating broadcasters as public trustees, Fowler and Brenner believed that
the public interest was best served by leaving broadcasters to respond solely to market
forces. See, e.g., Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broad-
cast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207 (1982); Brosterhous, supra note 84, at 342-43.
88. Under ascertainment, stations were required to interview representatives of impor-
tant groups within their community, determine their concerns, and provide programming
responsive to those concerns.
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processing guidelines that essentially required stations to broadcast news,
public affairs, and other informational programming, eliminating limits on
the amount of time devoted to commercials, and eliminating program re-
porting requirements. With the deregulation of radio and the FCC's fun-
damental questioning of the public trustee concept, television deregulation
was sure to follow.9 Because the NAB Code had been adopted to stave off
government regulation, once the threat of government regulation was re-
moved, the industry saw no reason to retain the Code.9'
3. Effectiveness of the NAB Code
It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the NAB Code because
there has been little academic study of it.92 Moreover, the NAB Code cov-
ered many different aspects of broadcasting and was frequently amended.
In evaluating effectiveness, this Article first examines some general limi-
tations on the Code's effectiveness and then looks at the effectiveness of
specific provisions.
89. Deregulation of Radio (Part 1 of 2), Report and Order (Proceeding Terminated),
84 F.C.C.2d 968, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1 (1981), recons., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 797, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 93 (1981), aff'd in part and remanded in
part, Office of Comm. of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 911 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
[hereinafter Deregulation of Radio Report and Order]. That same year, the FCC eliminated
the requirement that stations include in their renewal applications any information about
their program efforts. Radio Broadcast Services: Revision of Applications for Renewal of
License of Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM, and Television Licensees, Report
and Order, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 740 (1981), recons., Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, 87 F.C.C.2d 1127, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 704 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Black Citizens
for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
90. In fact, television was deregulated in 1984. Revision of Programming and Com-
mercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for
Commercial Television Stations, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1005 (1984), recons., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358, 60 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 526 (1986), aff'd in part and remanded in part, Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Deregulation of Television
Report and Order].
91. In 1990, the NAB did issue "voluntary programming principles" concerning chil-
dren's television, indecency and obscenity, drugs and substance abuse, and violence. Mac-
Carthy, supra note 50, at 687. However, it made clear that the application, interpretation,
and enforcement of these principles remained at the sole discretion of individual licensees.
Id. at 688. The NAB's Statement of Principles of Radio and Television Broadcasting are
included as Appendix C to the PIAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 127.
92. Professor Bruce A. Linton, the Chairman of the Radio-TV-Film Department of the
University of Kansas, published a useful outline in 1967. LiNTON, SELF-REGULATON iN
BROADCASTING, supra note 53, at 12. It summarizes the history, current activities, and some
of the problems with the NAB Code, but it cites no studies analyzing its effectiveness. Most
law review writing about the NAB Code focuses, not surprisingly, on the antitrust suit and
the Writers Guild's challenge to the Family Viewing Hour.
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a. General Limitations on Effectiveness
Linton, writing in 1967, found that the biggest obstacle to the NAB's
self-regulation was the extent of subscribership.93 At that time, 396 out of
631 television stations (63 percent) subscribed, and the percentage for ra-
dio stations was even lower.94 The most common reason for a station's re-
fusal to subscribe was that it could not comply with the advertising restric-
tions and still make a profit.95 Some stations objected more on grounds of
ideology or fear of government regulation: They viewed the Code of Prac-
tice as providing "a clear blueprint for increased government control ofb 7 •,,96
broadcasting. Yet, other stations declined to subscribe because they
found the standards too low. 97
In a 1975 article, Brenner characterized the "[a]pprehension of viola-
tions by the Code Authority [as] spotty at best."98 Code monitoring was
done by a randomly rotated, quantitative review of subscribers' program
logs conducted twice yearly. Because the staff could not be expected to
cover member stations with any regularity, it was forced to "rely mainly
on complaints by those few viewers aware of [the Code Authority's] exis-
tence or by subscribers themselves, who request Code review. ' 99
Where violations were found, the Code provided for "a 21-part sus-
pension procedure with final review residing with the Television Board of
Directors."'1'0 Suspension was rare. 01 As Brenner points out, the NAB was
reluctant to suspend stations because it did not want to lose dues-paying
93. Id. at 41-42.
94. These figures are consistent with Brenner's statement that as of January 1, 1975,
60% of television stations subscribed. Brenner, supra note 64, at 1530 n.17. In 1979, 65%
of television stations were members of the NAB, but the Television Code's influence may
have been greater than these numbers suggest. These 65% of stations accounted for 85% of
all viewing. Moreover, as far as commercials were concerned, since all of the three major
networks were members of the NAB and most stations at that time were network affiliates,
the network commercials presumably complied with the Code even if the affiliate was not a
member. Maddox & Zanot, supra note 53, at 125.
95. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING, supra note 53, at 50.
96. Id. at 52.
97. Brenner, supra note 64, at 1531 n.21.
98. Id. at 1531 n.22. •
99. Id. Linton notes that stations listened to each other and often complained to the
Code Authority if a competitor was not in compliance. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN
BROADCASTING, supra note 53, at 41.
100. Brenner, supra note 64, at 1532 n.22.
101. Indeed, the only case of suspension the Author found, involved the suspension or
withdrawal of 39 stations in the early 1960s for airing a commercial for "Preparation H,"
which the Code Review Board found unsuitable for television. However, several years later,
the Television Board of Directors reversed the Board's position, and 23 of the stations re-
joined. Id.
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members.'02 Moreover, the NAB's ultimate sanction was ineffective.
Broadcast historian Erik Bamouw describes the Television Code's
"enforcement machinery" as
among its most absurd features. If a subscribing station was charged
with violating the code and found guilty by an NAB review board, the
station (according to the rules) would lose the right to display on the
screen the NAB "seal of good practice." Since the seal meant nothing
to viewers and its absence would be virtually impossible to notice, the
. 103
machinery meant nothing.
Thus in general, effective enforcement of the Television Code was ham-
pered by the less-than-universal industry participation, limited resources,
and inadequate enforcement incentives.
b. Commercial Provisions
Most enforcement actions involving the NAB Code concerned the
commercial restrictions.'14 The NAB Code contained a variety of restric-
tions on the amount and type of commercial matter that could be broad-
cast. For example, the amount of nonprogram material (including adver-
tising) was limited to 9.5 minutes per hour in prime time and to sixteen
minutes per hour at all other times.'05 Advertising of hard liquor, fortune
telling, and fireworks was prohibited, while commercials for beer, wine,
and products of a personal nature were permitted so long as they were in
"good taste."' 6 In addition, broadcasters were responsible for making
available documentation to support the truthfulness of claims, demonstra-
tions, and testimonials contained in commercials.'07
In 1963, the FCC sought to transform the commercial time restric-
tions contained in the Code into regulations,'0 8 but this effort was aban-
doned due to the objections of the broadcasters.'09 Nonetheless, during the
102. 1d.
103. 3 ERIKBARNOUV, THE IMAGE EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM 1953, at 251 (1970).
104. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING, supra note 53, at 39.
105. NAB, THE TELEVSIION CODE 16-20 (19th ed. June 1976) [hereinafter TELEvISION
CODE]. Different advertising limits applied to children's programs. See infra Part
mIl.A.3.b(ii).
106. TELEVISION CODE, supra note 105, at 10-12.
107. Id. at 12-14. See generally Herbert J. Rotfeld et al., Self-Regulation and Television
Advertising, 19 L ADVER. 18, 19 (1990) (describing the advertising clearance procedures
when the NAB Code was in effect and how they changed after repeal of the Code).
108. Amendment of Part 3 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations with Respect to Ad-
vertising on Standard, FM, and Television Broadcasting Stations, Report and Order, 36
F.C.C. 45 (1964).
109. Broadcasters overwhelmingly opposed the FCC's proposal. Id. para. 2. In addition
to opposing the FCC's proposals in their comments, broadcasters complained to Congress
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1960s and 1970s, the FCC staff utilized the NAB Code as a processing
guideline in reviewing station license renewals.'10 These processing guide-
lines, in effect, established NAB Code compliance as a "safe harbor" with
detailed government review of the record of stations not meeting the Code.
Few stations were found to exceed the guidelines."' Thus, at least during
the 1960s and 1970s, the NAB Code was generally successful in limiting
the amount of commercials. Next, this Article examines some specific
types of advertising-cigarette advertising and advertising to children.
(i) Cigarette Advertising
One type of advertising that the NAB Code was unsuccessful in re-
stricting was that of cigarette advertising. In the 1960s, there was a great
deal of public concern about the impact of smoking on health."2 Much of
this concern focused on cigarette advertising. At that time, cigarette adver-
tising accounted for 10 percent of all broadcasting advertising revenues.13
According to the congressional testimony of Warren Braren, who was
the manager of the New York Code Authority office from 1960 until he
resigned in 1969, the NAB Code Authority staff proposed strict guidelines
for cigarette advertising in the summer of 1966.114 The proposed guidelines
and influenced the House of Representative to pass a bill that would have prevented the
FCC from adopting rules limiting the number of commercials. ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL.,
THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 193-96 (3d ed. 1982).
110. KRASNOW ETAL., supra note 109, at 196-97. See, e.g., Amendment of Part 0 of the
Comm'n's Rules, Order, 43 F.C.C.2d 638, 640 (1973) (delegating authority to Chief of the
Broadcast Bureau and directing that television stations proposing more than 16 minutes per
hour of commercial time be referred to the full Commission). These "delegations of author-
ity" to the staff, which permitted the staff to renew radio and television licenses so long as
they did not exceed certain advertising limits based on the NAB Code, were repealed in
1981 for radio and 1984 for television. See Deregulation of Radio Report and Order, supra
note 89; Deregulation of Television Report and Order, supra note 90.
111. Deregulation of Radio Report and Order, supra note 89, para. 83; Deregulation of
Television Report and Order, supra note 90, para. 59. In the antitrust litigation, however,
the court found the extent to which the NAB Code influenced the supply and price of com-
mercial time to be "a disputed issue of material fact." United States v. NAB, 536 F. Supp.
149, 158 (D.D.C. 1982).
112. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR
CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS
221-62 (1996).
113. MacCarthy, supra note 50, at 676. Moreover, broadcast advertising accounted for
approximately 70% of the cigarette makers' advertising budgets. KLUGER, supra note 112,
at 302.
114. Regulation of Radio and Television Cigarette Advertisements: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 5-10 (1969) [hereinafter
Cigarette Regulation Hearing] (statement of Warren Braren, Former Manager, New York
Office, National Association of Broadcasters Code Authority). See also KLUGER, supra note
112, at 331-32 (describing how Braren's testimony came about).
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would have prohibited the use of heroes to promote smoking, banned de-
pictions of smoking in advertisements, and ruled out cigarette advertise-
ments in sports settings. Yet, the Television Code Review Board rejected
these proposals, instead adopting weaker guidelines that required few or no
changes in then-existing advertising practices.
Even these limited guidelines were resisted by the tobacco companies
and television networks. Braren describes how the attempts at self-
regulation were rendered ineffectual due to the actions of some networks
and tobacco companies." 5 He attributed the network subscribers' lack of
support for the Code Authority to the impact on their advertising reve-
nues. Braren asserted that "the code authority is little more than a 'step-
child' of the NAB. The autonomy and power needed in order to become a
truly professional body acting objectively to serve the public interest is ab-
sent."' 17 The NAB's failure to address the concerns about cigarette adver-
tising was one of the factors responsible for Congress's adoption of an out-
right prohibition on broadcast advertising of cigarettes.I' 8
(ii) Children's Advertising
The Television Code met greater success, at least for a time, in lim-
iting the amount of advertising on children's programs as well as prevent-
ing direct governmental regulation of advertising on children's television.
The NAB first adopted toy advertising guidelines in 1961. These guide-
lines were modest in scope and substance. At that time, there was little ad-
vertising directed at children and little research about children's under-
standing of advertising.' 9 By the 1970s, however, the nature of advertising
to children had changed. The concentration of children's programming on
Saturday mornings led to more focused advertising. 20 Concerns about ad-
115. For example, he describes how the American Tobacco Co., which had withdrawn
from the tobacco industry's own code in 1967, repeatedly violated the broadcasting guide-
lines by airing commercials that had never been submitted to the Code Authority. American
Tobacco took the view that if a commercial was approved by television networks, there was
no reason for the Code Authority to raise any questions. Cigarette Regulation Hearing, su-
pra note 114, at 7.
116. Id. at9.
117. Id. at 10.
118. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994). Inter-
estingly, it was broadcasters, rather than the tobacco companies that unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the advertising prohibition. See Capital Brdcst. Co. v.
Mitchell, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
119. Dale Kunkel & Walter Gantz, Assessing Compliance with Industry Self-Regulation
of Television Advertising to Children, 21 J. APPLIED COMM. RESEARCH 148, 151 (1993)
[hereinafter Kunkel & Gantz, Assessing Compliance].
120. Id.
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vertising on children's television were raised in the early 1970s by groups
such as Action for Children's Television (ACT). Action for Children's
Television called on the FCC, as well as the FTC, to prohibit or limit ad-
vertising directed at children.
While the FCC deliberated on the ACT proposal, the NAB amended
the Television Code to diminish the number of children's advertise-.121 2
ments. In 1974, the FCC declined to adopt limits on children's adver-
tising, noting that the NAB had proposed limits to go into effect in 1976 of
9.5 minutes on weekend children's programs and twelve minutes for chil-
dren's programs shown during the week.
23
In 1979, a task force established by the FCC found that broadcasters
had in general complied with the NAB's advertising guidelines.124 How-
ever, with the subsequent abandonment of the NAB Code in 1983 and the
deregulation of television in 1984, all limits on advertising on children's
shows were removed and advertising increased.'2 Eventually, Congress
directed the FCC to adopt numerical limits in the Children's Television
121. KRASNOWEWAL., supra note 109, at 198. In response to the FCC's urging, the NAB
also amended its Code to prohibit host selling on children's programs. See American Fed-
eration of Television and Radio Artists v. NAB, 407 F. Supp. 900, 901-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
122. Also in 1974, the National Association of Advertisers created the Children's Ad-
vertising Review Unit (CARU), which is discussed infra Part III.B.
123. Petition of Action for Children's Television (ACT) for Rulemaking Looking To-
ward the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming
and the Establishment of a Weekly 14-Hour Quota of Children's Television Programs,
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, par. 43, 31 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1228 (1974) [hereinafter Children's Television Report and Policy Statement].
The FCC also relied on the fact that the Association of Independent Television Stations
(INTV) had also proposed limits. Moreover, the NAB had recently amended its advertising
Code to require a separation device between programming and commercials and to prohibit
host selling. Id. paras. 49, 52. The FCC acknowledged that some stations were not members
of either the NAB or INTV, but warned they too would be expected to bring their advertis-
ing practices into conformance with the Code requirements. Id. para. 43 n.13. Action for
Children's Television appealed the FCC's decision to rely on industry self-regulation, and
the court found the FCC's actions reasonable. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
564 F.2d 458, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
124. Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, Noticed of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 75 F.C.C.2d 138, para. 5 (1979) (citing 2 FCC, TELEVISION PRO-
GRAMMING FOR CHILDREN: A REPORT OF THE CHILDREN'S TELEVISION TASK FORCE 47-60
(Oct. 1979)).
125. See, e.g., Dale Kunkel & Donald Roberts, Young Minds and Marketplace Values:
Issues in Children's Television Advertising, 47 J. Soc. IssuEs 57, 68 (1991); Dale Kunkel &
Walter Gantz, Children's Television Advertising in the Multichannel Environment, 42 J.
COMM. 134, 143-44, 147 (1992) (finding children's advertising on networks in 1990 aver-
aged 10:05 minutes per hour compared to eight minutes in 1983; also noting the develop-
ment of a new type of advertising/program combinations).
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Act of 1990. 16 The numerical limits in the Act-10.5 minutes per hour onS 127
weekends and twelve minutes per hour on weekdays 1-were slightly
higher than those in the former NAB Code. Thus, with the exception of
cigarette advertising, the NAB Code seems to have enjoyed relative suc-
cess in limiting advertising.
c. Programming Provisions
In contrast to advertising, the NAB's Television Code seems to have
had less effect in the programming area. The Program Standards of the
Television Code contained both general and specific prescriptions and pro-
scriptions. For example, Part I, Principles Governing Program Content,
advised broadcasters to "be conversant with the general and specific needs,
interests and aspirations ... of the communities they serve. They should
affirmatively seek out responsible representatives of all parts of their
communities so that they may structure a broad range of programs that will
inform, enlighten, and entertain the total audience.
' ' 8
Other sections dealt with responsibility toward children, community
responsibility, special program standards, treatment of news and public
events, controversial public issues, political telecasts, and religious pro-
grams. As one writer put it, the Code served as "a readymade articulation
of... professional conscience that may be exhibited in the event of inquiry
by the FCC or community groups."129 It was closely tied to and represented
a further articulation of the public trustee concept in broadcasting.3
Few studies analyzing compliance with programming provisions ex-
ist, and they are limited to children's programming. Such studies would
have been difficult to conduct because many of the program areas covered• .• 132
by the Television Code were also subject to FCC regulation, and thus, it
126. Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303a (1994)).
127. 47 U.S.C. § 303a(b) (1994).
128. TELEvmsION CODE, supra note 105, at 2. This principle essentially embodied the
FCC's then-existing requirement that broadcast stations conduct ascertainment. See supra
note 88.
129. Brenner, supra note 64, at 1531.
130. Brosterhous, supra note 84, at 314.
131. There is some anecdotal evidence that Code provisions were effective in keeping
some types of programming off the air. For example, in the Mark case, NBC cited the NAB
Code as the reason for declining to allow an astrologist to appear as a guest on the Tonight
Show. Mark v. FCC, 468 F.2d 266 (1st Cir. 1972).
132. Brosterhous, supra note 84, at 314.
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would be difficult if not impossible to attribute findings of compliance to
the Television Code rather than to the FCC's regulation.'33
The study by the FCC Task Force suggests that self-regulation of
children's programming was generally ineffective. The one program provi-
sion in the NAB Code that seemed to be effective-the so-called "Family
Viewing Policy"-was subject to litigation and eventually repealed.
(i) Children's Program Provisions
Part II of the Television Code, "Responsibility Toward Children,"
addressed affirmative programming responsibilities:
Broadcasters have a special responsibility to children. Programs de-
signed primarily for children should take into account the range of in-
terests and needs of children from instructional and cultural material to
a wide variety of entertainment material. In their totality, programs
should contribute to the sound, balanced development of children to
help them achieve a sense of the world at large and informed adjust-
134
ments to their society.
This Part appears to have had little effect. Peggy Charren, the founder of
Action for Children's Television and a member of the Advisory Commit-
tee, observed at the meeting discussing the proposed voluntary code:
There are aspects of the old [NAB] code, like the description of how to
serve children, that were never paid any attention to. They actually
sounded like I wrote them, and if they were happening during the 30
years I was in business, I never would have started [Action for Chil-
dren's Television]. 35
Indeed, the Children's Television Task Force, which was directed by
the FCC to "determine the effectiveness of industry self-regulation," found
that broadcasters had not complied with programming guidelines. 36 Spe-
cifically, it found that broadcasters had failed to provide a reasonable
amount of educational and informational programming.13 Public and con-
133. For example, the provisions concerning controversial public issues (Part VI) track
the FCC's Fairness Doctrine. Indeed, the section on Political Telecasts (Part VII) refers to
the Communications Act and FCC regulations on political broadcasting. TELEvISION CODE,
supra note 105.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Open Meeting of Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of Digital
Television Broadcasters, June 8, 1998, at 24-25 (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.ntia.
doc.gov/pubintadvcom/junemtg/transcript-am.htm>.
136. 1 FCC, TELEVISION PROGRAMMING FOR CHILDREN: A REPORT OF THE CHILDREN'S
TELEVISION TASK FORCE REPORT 2 (Oct. 1979) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT VOL. 1].
137. 2 FCC, TELEVISION PROGRAMMING FOR CHILDREN: A REPORT OF THE CHILDREN'S
TELEVISION TASK FORCE REPORT 25 (Oct. 1979) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT VOL. 2].
It also found that television stations had failed to increase the overall amount of children's
programming, id. at 17, had failed to air age-specific programs for children, id. at 28, and
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gressional dissatisfaction with broadcasters' program offerings for children
eventually led to the passage of the Children's Television Act of 1990,138
and ultimately, the guideline that each station offer a minimum of three
hours per week of programming specifically designed to serve the educa-
tional and informational needs of children.
39
(ii) The Family Viewing Policy
In addition to imposing a duty to affirmatively provide programming
for children, the Television Code was amended in 1975 to limit children's
exposure to programming containing violence, sex, or offensive language.
Under what came to be known as the Family Viewing Policy, programs
deemed inappropriate for general family audiences could not be shown
during the first two hours of network programming in prime tiMe.'4 The
practical effect of this policy was to require that such programs be sched-
uled after 9 P.M. This action came after a great deal of pressure from Con-
gress and the FCC to address the problem of televised violence.'4 ' The
Writers Guild, which represented program producers, challenged the Fam-
ily Viewing Policy in district court. It argued that the NAB's adoption of
the Family Viewing Policy was not the result of voluntary industry self-
regulation, but had been coerced by the government, and as a result, it con-
stituted state action in violation of the First Amendment.
The district court allowed extensive discovery, and some of its find-
ings provide interesting insights into the operation of the NAB Code. For
example, the court found that a high level official at CBS was genuinely
concerned with the level of violence on television, but
feared that if CBS publicly committed itself to [the family viewing
policy] that the commitment would work to CBS's competitive disad-
vantage in the absence of a binding enforcement mechanism applica-
ble to the industry at large. Past experience in children's programming
had led him to the conviction that broadcasters, more interested in
dollars than in the public interest, would use violence as a tool to hike
program ratings if they were left free to program in their own discre-
tion. CBS was thus prepared to delegate its program discretion to the
that many stations were continuing to schedule children's programming only on weekends,
id. at42.
138. Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996-1000 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§
303a, 303b, and 394 (1994)).
139. Policy and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Report and Or-
der, 11 F.C.C.R. 10,660, paras. 159-63, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1385 (1996).
140. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
141. Id. at 1094-95.
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NABf but only if its major competitors could be persuaded to do so as
well.
The court found that at least as to the Family Viewing Policy, "the NAB
function[ed] as an effective enforcement mechanism."1 43
The district court agreed with the Writers Guild on the state action
claim and found that the FCC had violated the First Amendment.' 44 Al-
though the court conceded that there would be no First Amendment issue
if the networks had truly decided to regulate themselves, or even if the
regulation was the product of government "encouragement," it found that
the type of indirect coercion engaged in by the government raised censor-
ship issues under the First Amendment and the Communications Act.1
45
The district court's decision was overturned by the court of appeals
for lack of jurisdiction. 46 The court of appeals also questioned the exis-
tence of state action and remanded the case to the FCC for determination.
Not surprisingly, the FCC concluded that no improper coercion had oc-
curred. 4 7 Yet, the Family Viewing Policy was never restored. In the
meantime, the DOJ had brought an antitrust suit against the NAB. Al-
though nothing in the antitrust suit required abandonment of the parts of
the Code concerning violence and other programming inappropriate for
children, the NAB decided to abandon the Code in its entirety. 148
A few years later, Congress passed a law exempting broadcasters
from the antitrust laws so that they could take collective action to reduce
violent programming. 149 They did nothing to take advantage of this legis-
lation, however. The broadcasters' failure to do so once the risk of antitrust
liability was removed suggests that they had instituted the Family Viewing
142. Id. at 1094.
143. Id. at 1123-34.
144. Id. at 1151. The court also found that the FCC violated the Administrative Proce-
dure Act because it had adopted a new policy without conducting a notice and comment
rule making as required by section 553. Id.
145. Id. The court made detailed factual findings about the role of the FCC, and par-
ticularly its Chairman, in pressuring the networks and the NAB into adopting the family
viewing hour policy. Id. at 1092-122.
146. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc. v. American Brdcst. Cos., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1979).
147. Primary Jurisdiction Referral of Claims Against Government Defendant Arising
from the Inclusion in the NAB Television Code of the "Family Viewing Policy," Report, 95
F.C.C.2d 700 (1983).
148. See supra Part UI.A.2.
149. Television Program Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5127 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303c (1994)). See also MacCarthy, supra note 50, at 686-93
(describing the Television Program Improvement Act of 1990, sponsored by Senator Paul
Simon, that granted broadcasters a three-year exemption from the antitrust laws to permit
the industry to draft joint standards to reduce violence on television).
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Policy only to respond to government pressure and that they believed the
First Amendment insulated them from such pressure.
Thus, in general, during the thirty years in which the Television Code
was in effect, it had its greatest effect on advertising. However, some of
the advertising provisions were found to violate the antitrust laws. The
programming provisions were generally ignored or at least not enforced.
The one programming provision that actually had an impact-the Family
Viewing Hour-was found to violate the First Amendment.
B. Children's Advertising Review Unit
Although not as old as the NAB Code, the Guidelines of the Chil-
dren's Advertising Review Unit (CARU) have been in operation for almost
twenty-five years. The National Advertising Division (NAD) of the Coun-
cil of Better Business Bureaus created CARU in 1974, the same year that
the FCC issued its Children's Television Report and Policy Statement.'5'
At that time, Action for Children's Television had not only asked the FCC
to eliminate or restrict advertising on children's programs, but it and other
consumer groups had petitioned the FTC to take action with respect to
children's advertising. In response, the FTC proposed to prohibit all ad-
vertising to children under age eight and to limit other types of advertising
directed at children, particularly sugared cereals.'52
The CARU was "established to forestall efforts by groups outside the
industry which would severely restrict or even ban advertising to chil-
dren."' 53 Yet, its creation was met with considerable skepticism by the FTC
and consumer groups that questioned whether an organization funded by
industry, especially one with so little consumer representation, could ob-
jectively regulate advertising practices.
150. Eventually, of course, most of the industry agreed to provide program ratings that
were designed to allow parents to block programming they thought unsuitable for their
children. See infra Part III.C.6.
151. The NAD also administers a code for advertising generally. See NAD, Procedures
(visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.bbb.com/advertising/nadproc.html>. This Article does
not attempt to assess the effectiveness of that effort. Self-regulation of advertising is fairly
common throughout the world. See generally JEAN J. BODDEWYN, GLOBAL PERSPEC2IVEs ON
ADVERTISiNG SELF-REGULATION (1992) (surveying self-regulation of advertising in 38
countries).
152. FTC, FTC STAFF REPORT ON TELE VISION ADVERaTnsiNG TO CHILDREN 320-24, 328-
41 (Feb. 1978). The FrC never adopted these rules, however, as Congress terminated its
authority to do so. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-252, § 11, 94 Stat. 374 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1994)).
153. Gary M. Armstrong, An Evaluation of the Children's Advertising Review Unit, 3 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 38, 40 (1984).
154. Id. at 38.
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The CARU promulgated guidelines that apply to all forms of chil-
dren's advertising. The CARU Guidelines list six basic principles for ad-
vertising directed to children.' For example, advertisers are advised to
"always take into account the level of knowledge, sophistication and ma-
turity of the audience" and that they "have a special responsibility to pro-
tect children from their own susceptibilities."'56 Likewise, they should
"exercise care not to exploit unfairly the imaginative quality of chil-
dren."'157 In addition, separate sections address specific problem areas:
product presentation and claims; sales pressure; comparative claims; en-
dorsement and promotion by program or editorial characters; premiums,
promotions, and sweepstakes; and safety.
158
Some provisions duplicate FCC policies, while others go beyond
them. For example, the prohibition on the use of program personalities to
sell products is similar to the FCC's policy against "host selling," 9 while
the prohibition on urging children to ask parents or others to buy products
is not an FCC policy. Other provisions delineate deceptive or unfair ad-
vertising practices that might run afoul of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.'60 The Guidelines have been amended from time to time.
Most significantly, CARU issued special guidelines in 1994 concerning
recorded telephone messages and again in 1997 concerning online adver-
tising. With the demise of the NAB Code in 1982, the CARU Guidelines
were left as the only remaining industry-wide policy for children's adver-
• • 161
tising.
155. The Children's Advertising Review Unit 1997 Self Regulatory Guidelines for Chil-
dren's Advertising (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.bbb.org/advertising/caruguid.
html> [hereinafter CARU Guidelines].
156. Id. Principle 1.
157. Id. Principle 2.
158. Id.
159. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, supra note 123, paras. 49-52.
160. For example, in Azrak-Hamway International, Inc., Consent Agreement, 61 Fed.
Reg. 6841 (FTC 1996), the FTC alleged that certain toy advertisements on television de-
picting toys doing things that they could not do in actual use were false and misleading un-
der section 5 of the FTC Act. As part of the proposed settlement, the company agreed to
send letters to the stations running the spots advising them of the CARU Guidelines. The
letter notes that in adopting the CARU Guidelines, "the advertising industry has undertaken
various self-regulatory efforts to assist companies to comply with the law and to promote
other industry goals." Id. at 6846.
161. Kunkel & Gantz, Assessing Compliance, supra note 119, at 148.
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1. Effectiveness of CARU's Advertising Guidelines
,'.r •162
Several studies have evaluated CARU's effectiveness. Armstrong
reviewed CARU's activities during its first ten years. 163 He found that a
large proportion of CARU's activities involved casework.' 64 The CARU
staff (which consisted of four persons including secretarial personnel)
monitored children's advertising. It also received complaints from outside
sources, but Armstrong found that only 14 percent of cases came fromS • 165
sources other than momtorng. The staff would evaluate advertisements
against the Guidelines. The CARU could address problems informally'6 or
by opening a formal investigation. After an investigation, which may in-
volve internal review, product testing, or consultation with outside experts,
the CARU had three options. First, it could find the advertisement accept-
able and dismiss the case. Second, it could find the advertisement unac-
ceptable and request that the advertiser discontinue or modify the adver-
tisement. Third, it could find the advertisement questionable and request
substantiation. 167 Armstrong found that CARU dismissed 7 percent of the
cases, requested advertisers to discontinue or modify the advertisement in
71 percent of the cases, and sought substantiation in 22 percent of the
168
cases.
Compliance with CARU's rulings is purely voluntary. The CARU
has no sanctions or enforcement power. Where an advertiser is noncoop-
erative, CARU may refer the case to regulatory agencies such as the FTC
162. One study by Gary M. Armstrong was published in 1984 and evaluated the first 10
years of CARU's existence. See supra note 153. The other study was conducted by Dale
Kunkel and Walter Gantz in 1990. The results of this study are presented in two different
papers: DALE KUNKEL & WALTER GANTZ, TELEVISION ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN: MESSAGE
CONTENT IN 1990, REPORT TO THE CHILDREN'S ADVERTISING REvIEw UNIT (Jan. 1991)
[hereinafter KUNKEL & GANTZ, CARU REPORT] and Kunkel & Gantz, Assessing Compli-
ance, supra note 119.
163. The following description is from Armstrong, supra note 153, at 41.
164. Other activities include a voluntary film submission program in which advertisers
may submit review copies before running a commercial, a Clearinghouse for Research on
Children's Advertising, and occasional "outreach" activities. Armstrong notes that CARU's
activities in these areas had been substantially cut back. Id.
165. Specifically, CARU staff monitors network, independent, and cable television pro-
gramming at "child viewing times," as well as child-directed advertisements at nonchild
viewing times. It also monitors children's magazines and comic books. Id.
166. Id. This behind-the-scenes activity was not reported. The practice of dealing with
problems informally continues today. The CARU Web page reports that in 1994 while it
monitored more than 17,000 television commercials, it initiated only 55 informal inquiries
and five formal cases. Children's Advertising Review Unit (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.bbb.orgladvertising/childrensMonitor.html>.
167. Armstrong, supra note 153, at 47-49.
168. Id.
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and FCC. 169 Armstrong observes that "CARU's most powerful sanction is
public notice."' 70 Case summaries are reported by the National Advertising
Division and are typically covered by the press.171
Armstrong analyzed all reported cases from the creation of CARU
through October 1982. There were 147 cases, 63 percent of which dealt
with television advertisements. The cases involved eighty-five different
advertisers, the majority of whom were selling toys or food products. He
found that deception was the most common violation.
Armstrong found that CARU had a small case load, averaging fifteen
cases per year and falling. He notes that "[t]hough casework may provide
input for the development and testing of the [CARU's] guidelines, this
volume of cases is probably too small to enforce the guidelines effectively
or to set meaningful precedents for the improvement of advertising to chil-
dren."'
173
In addition, he found that "[t]he level of case activity appears to
fluctuate substantially with external pressures on children's advertising.
For example, efforts peaked in 1978-79 when the industry was threatened
by the FTC trade regulation rule on children's advertising. When the threat
had passed, the caseload decreased considerably.' 74 He concludes that
"[i]n the face of harsh constraints, [CARU] has made notable contributions
toward improvement of child-directed advertising, especially in its earlier
169. See, e.g., Dr. Frederick Beitenfeld, Jr., President WHYY, Inc., Letter, 7 F.C.C.R.
7123, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1014 (1992). CARU filed a complaint alleging that a public
television station in Philadelphia violated the FCC's policy against host selling. Self-Reg
Unit Refers Toy Ad to FTC, FTC: WATCH, Sept. 18, 1996 (noting that CARU referred a
television advertisement to the FTC alleging possible deception and safety concerns about a
television advertisement portraying a doll whose eyelids, lips, and legs are shown changing
color and that is shown with a razor resembling a real razor, and the advertiser refused to
participate in self-regulatory process). Referral to federal agencies is rare. According to
CARU Director Elizabeth Lascoutx, in it first 23 years, CARU only referred complaints to
federal agencies three times-two to the FTC and one to the FCC. Michael Hartnett, Hold
on There, Soupy! Advertising Guidelines by the Children's Advertising Review Unit, 16
FOOD & BEVERAGE MKTG. 24 (1997). Recently, at least one additional referral has been
made. See FTC: WATCH, Jan. 26, 1998 (reporting that CARU referred complaint to FTC
where advertisement showed baby doll shedding tears without any method of operation and
producer promised but failed to make recommended changes).
170. Armstrong, supra note 153, at 41.
171. According to Armstrong, the summaries were reported regularly in Advertising Age
and the New York Times. In addition, they were published in a Council of Better Business
Bureaus (CBBB) volume titled NAD/NARB Decisions. Id. at 42. That practice continues
today.
172. Decisions may be appealed through the National Advertising Review Board
(NARB) appeals procedure. However, at the time Armstrong was writing, no appeals had
been made. Id. at 41.
173. Id. at 51.
174. Id. at 51-52.
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years. However, CARU has been given too much to do with too little
means."
175
Another study by Kunkel and Gantz was designed to assess: "How
effective are [the CARU] self-regulatory guidelines at generating compli-
ance with their stated policies? 1 76 They identified thirty-nine measurable
criteria in the guidelines,'" and using samples of programs recorded in
1990, they analyzed the commercials using the identified criteria. 17
Out of 10,329 commercials reviewed, they found 385 (3.7 percent)
violated the CARU Guidelines in one or more respects.179 They found vio-
lations across all channels, with cable networks more likely to have viola-
tions than independent stations, and independent stations more likely to
have violations than major network (ABC, CBS, and NBC) affiliates. They
also found violations across product types. Of six basic product groups,
advertisements for toys and breakfast cereals were the least likely to have
violations, while advertisements for fast foods and recorded telephone
message service were the most likely to violate the CARU Guidelines." 0
Given the limits on CARU's operation and the burgeoning market-
place of advertising to children, Kunkel and Gantz found it "impressive"
that 96 percent of all commercials observed in the study were found to
comply; and that even greater compliance was found for the two types of
products most frequently advertised on children's programs." At the same
time, they caution that their study does not provide an overall assessment
of the CARU Guidelines. They cite research indicating that some problems
with children's advertising are not addressed by the Guidelines.'82
175. Id. at 52.
176. Kunkel & Gantz, Assessing Compliance, supra note 119, at 152.
177. Id. Two guidelines were excluded from the study because the researchers were not
able to measure compliance: The guideline that states that "personal endorsements should
reflect the actual experiences and beliefs of the endorser" was excluded because the re-
searchers lacked knowledge of the endorser's experience. Id. at 153. Similarly, the guide-
line that states that "care should be taken not to exploit a child's imagination" was excluded
as too subjective to evaluate. Id.
178. They recorded a total of 604 hours of children's programming, which included
10,329 commercials (many were repetitions). Samples were recorded in seven medium to
large television markets around the country. The sample included programming from
broadcast networks, independent stations, and basic cable channels. They used a technique
called the composite week. Id. at 152-53.
179. Id. at 154. Of the 385 advertisements found in violation, 85 contained multiple
violations, for a total of 492 violations. Id.
180. Id. at 155.
181. Id. at 159.
182. Id. at 160. For example, while cereal advertisers adhere to the guidelines that re-
quire sugared cereals to be portrayed as only a part of a healthy diet, research showed that
disclaimers accomplished little in terms of improving children's understanding about the
product. Id.
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It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the effectiveness of
the CARU Guidelines from these two studies conducted at different times
looking at different data. While Kunkel and Gantz suggest that CARU has
been largely successful in implementing the stated goals of the Guidelines,
another interpretation is possible. One might wonder why if almost 4 per-
cent of children's commercials shown in one week violate the CARU
Guidelines, CARU has only brought an average of fifteen cases per year.
Moreover, the number of cases in recent years seems to have declined.
During the first eight months of 1995, CARU reportedly monitored more
than 10,000 commercials, yet initiated only thirty-five informal inquiries
and three formal cases."' Children's Advertising Review Unit Director
Elizabeth Lascoutx asserts that more cases are not filed because advertisers
have learned to follow the rules, and "'[t]hey know that the alternative to
this kind of self-regulation is government regulation that could be much
more intrusive. "u But, the low number of cases could also mean that• 185
CARU is not doing its job.
2. Children's Advertising Review Unit's Online Privacy
Guidelines
In 1997, with the rapid growth of the Internet and other online serv-
ices, CARU amended its Guidelines to take into account a new form of ad-
vertising to children-online advertising. The Children's Advertising Re-
view Unit's action was prompted by concerns raised about the collection
of information from children on Web sites by the FTC. This issue was first
discussed at the FTC's roundtable on Consumer Privacy on the Global In-
formation Infrastructure held in June 1996. 6 After the FTC announced
that it was going to hold a second workshop on privacy issues, CARU re-
vised its Guidelines to include online advertising in April 1997."'
In the section labeled "Guidelines for Interactive Electronic Media
(e.g. Internet and Online Services)," CARU made it clear that the general
principles regarding children's advertising applied to online and Internet
183. Rick Montgomery, Wouldn't It Be Cool If..., KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 5, 1995,
at A21.
184. Id. (quoting Elizabeth Lascoutx, Director, CARU).
185. Id. See also Ray Richmond, Singing? Under Water? With the Holidays Coming,
It's Time to Beware of Deceptive Toy Ads, CHI. TRM., Nov. 23, 1992, at E3 (noting com-
plaints by consumer representatives that many television commercials targeting children
exaggerate, deceive, and mislead and that effective policing is lacking).
186. FTC, Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure
(visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp96/privacy.htm>
[hereinafter Privacy Workshop].
187. CARU Guidelines, supra note 155.
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advertising. It also adopted some specific guidelines governing online
sales to children and the collection of data from children online. For ex-
ample, in the section on data collection, the Guidelines state that advertis-
ers should: (1) remind children to obtain parental permission before asking
them to supply information; (2) disclose why information is being re-
quested and whether it will be shared with others; (3) disclose the passive
collection of information; and (4) make "reasonable efforts" to obtain pa-
rental permission if they collect identifiable information. When CARU
finds that an advertisement or Web site is inconsistent with the Guidelines,
it "seeks changes through the voluntary cooperation of advertisers."'88
Since adopting these new Guidelines, CARU has brought a few for-
mal cases involving Web sites as well as undertaken some informal re-
views. The Children's Advertising Review Unit's first case was against the
Beanie Babies Web site. This site came to CARU's attention because of a
report issued by the Center for Media Education. The Children's Adver-
tising Review Unit found that although the site contained several areas
where visitors could enter information about themselves and communicate
directly with each other, it had no notice of its information collection or
privacy policies. In 1998, CARU took formal action involving at least
two other Web sites. 190 In addition, CARU undertook informal investiga-
tions of Web sites and conducted compliance reviews on request.19'
The FTC examined the adequacy of the CARU Guidelines in its Re-
port to Congress in June 1998. It found that the CARU Guidelines were
consistent with the principles outlined earlier by the FTC staff in an opin-
188. Id.
189. Ty, Inc., operator of the Beanie Babies Web site, responded by making changes to
the site. Beanie Babies Website, 27 NAD Case Reports (CBBB) 194 (Nov. 1997). See also
Stuart Elliott, Self-Regulation in Cyberspace: The Web Site for Beanie Babies Undergoes
Several Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at D3.
190. Lisa Frank Website, 28 NAD Case Reports (CBBB) 225 (Sept. 1998) (finding fail-
ure to give notice regarding information collection policy or privacy policy and inadequate
labeling of advertising material); Trendmasters, Inc. Website, 28 NAD Case Reports
(CBBB) 244 (Sept. 1998) (finding Web site featuring information about toy product lines,
downloadable games, and survey failed to include privacy policy and did not clearly iden-
tify advertising).
191. The NAD Case Reports notes that when advertising is "immediately modified or
discontinued, CARU will not open a formal case in the matter" but does report the results.
Inquiries, 28 NAD Case Reports (CBBB) 247 (Sept. 1998). The NAD Case Reports dis-
closes informal investigations of the Nickelodeon and Dole Web sites and review of the
Chevron site. Id. See also The Jupiter Interview: Elizabeth Lascoutx, CARU, DIGITAL KIDs
REPORT, Aug. 1996, at 12 (describing how General Mills' You Rule School advertising site
went through approval process with CARU).
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ion letter regarding the KidsCom Web site.' 92 Moreover, it noted that
CARU has an enforcement mechanism in place and has
achieved a remarkably high level of compliance under this mechanism
in the offline media over a long period of time. While CARU has
worked to encourage Web sites to adhere to its privacy guidelines with
respect to the collection of personal information from children online,
to date it has not achieved the same widespread adherence it has
achieved in other media.
93
Indeed, the FTC found that as of March 1998, nearly a year after is-
suance of the CARU Guidelines, serious problems still remained.'9 The
FTC surveyed 212 Web sites directed to children. It found that 89 percent
of those sites collected one or more types of personal information from
children,'95 and that "[o]ften the sites that collect personal identifying in-
formation also collect several other types of information, enabling them to
form a detailed profile of a child."'1 96 The survey revealed that sites used a
variety of techniques to solicit personal information, including registration,
contests, imaginary characters, guest books, pen pal programs, and
prizes.
197
192. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at 17. In contrast to the CARU Guidelines, the FrC
found that the Children's Guidelines of the Direct Marketing Association did not conform
to the Staff Opinion Letter. Id. at 18. The Staff Opinion Letter was issued in July 1997, in
response to a complaint filed by the Center for Media Education, for which the Author
served as counsel. The complaint alleged that KidsCom, a Web site directed at children ages
four to fifteen, violated section 5 of the FTC Act. Since KidsCom had changed its practices,
the FTC declined to take enforcement action against it. However, the FTC letter set forth
the staff's analysis of KidsCom's past practices "[t]o provide guidance in this area" and to
offer "several broad principles [which] apply generally to online information collection
from children." Letter from Jodie Bernstein, Director, FrC's Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, to Kathryn C. Mongtomery, President, and Jeffrey A. Chester, Executive Director,
Center for Media Education 2 (July 15, 1997) (on file with author).
The FTC found that KidsCom's information collection practices had likely violated
section 5 in two ways. First, the FTC found that it was
a deceptive practice to represent that a Web site is collecting personally identifi-
able information from a child for a particular purpose (e.g., to earn points to re-
deem a premium), when the information will also be used for another purpose
which parents would find material, in the absence of a clear and prominent disclo-
sure to that effect.
Id. at 3-4 (citation omitted). Second, the FTC found it was an unfair practice "to collect per-
sonally identifiable information.., from children and sell or otherwise disclose such identi-
fiable information to third parties without providing parents with adequate notice ... and an
opportunity to control the collection and use of the information." Id. at 5.
193. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at 17 (footnotes omitted).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 31. Personal information collected included name, e-mail address, postal ad-
dress, telephone number, social security number, age, date of birth, gender, education, in-
terests, and hobbies. Id. at 31-32.
196. Id. at 32.
197. Id. at 33.
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Using a very broad definition of disclosure, the FTC found that 54
percent of children's sites had some kind of disclosure.9 However, no
site's information practice disclosure statement discussed the full range of
fair information practice principles. Moreover, many sites disclosed chil-
dren's personal information to third parties, thereby creating a risk of in-
jury or exploitation. Only 23 percent of Web sites told children to ask par-
ents for permission, while only 1 percent required parental consent before
personal information was collected or used.' 99 The FTC concluded that its
survey showed "a very low level of compliance with the basic parental
control principles contained in the staff opinion letter and the CARU
guidelines more than seven months after these documents were re-
leased."2
Finding its own authority insufficient to address the problems, the
FTC recommended that Congress adopt legislation. Even in calling for
legislation, however, the FTC emphasized its preference for self-
regulation:
The Commission has encouraged industry to address consumer con-
cerns regarding online privacy through self-regulation. The Internet is
a rapidly changing marketplace. Effective self-regulation remains de-
sirable because it allows firms to respond quickly to technological
changes and employ new technologies to protect consumer privacy.
Accordingly, a private-sector response to consumer concerns that in-
corporates widely-accepted fair information practices and provides for
effective enforcement mechanisms could afford consumers adequate
privacy protection. To date, however, the Commission has not seen an
effective self-regulatory system emerge.
Nonetheless, the FTC's legislative proposal closely tracked CARU's
Guidelines.2
The legislation passed by Congress authorizes the FTC to promulgate
regulations that generally require commercial Web site operators to give
notice and obtain consent from the parent of a child under the age of thir-
198. Id. at 34. Of sites that collect personal information and have at least one informa-
tion practice disclosure, 43% say they provide children or parents choice about how infor-
mation is used; 12% say they offer access or an opportunity to correct information; 8% say
they provide security; and 12% say they will notify parents. Only 24% of sites that col-
lected personal information had posted a privacy policy notice. Id.
199. Id. at 37. Only 8% say that parents can ask for a child's information to be deleted or
not used ("opt-out").
200. Id. at 38.
201. Id. at 41.
202. Compare id. at 43, with CARU's Reasonable Efforts Standard (visited Mar. 15,
1999) <http://www.bbb.orgladvertising/caruefforts.html> (noting that both would require
prior parental consent where personally identifiable information would allow someone to
contact the child offline or where it is publicly posted or disclosed to third parties).
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teen before collecting personally identifiable information from the child. It
also directs the FTC to "provide incentives for self-regulation" by offering
a "safe harbor" from prosecution for companies that comply with self-
regulatory guidelines issued by industry that have been found by the FTC,
after notice and comment, to meet the requirements of the law. 3
In sum, CARU has had moderate to good success in ensuring that
television advertisers comply with its advertising guidelines. It has had lit-
tle success, however, with the children's online privacy guidelines. Several
factors might explain the different levels of success. First, the number of
products advertised to children on television is fairly limited, consisting
primarily of toys, breakfast foods, and fast foods.204 However, the number
of companies offering Web sites to children, while including these same1. 205
advertisers, appears to be much larger and diverse. Moreover, in the case
of television advertising, if CARU was unable to get voluntary cooperation
from an advertiser, it could always file a complaint with the FCC or FTC.
In the case of children's privacy, however, the FTC acknowledged that its
ability to act in this area was limited. 206 Finally, the privacy guidelineshave been in effect for a much shorter period of time.
C. Other Self-Regulatory Efforts Involving Media
1. Advertising of Hard Liquor
207While the NAB Code prohibited the advertising of hard liquor,
broadcast advertising of hard liquor was also prohibited by the "Code of
Good Practice" of DISCUS. 20' Distilled Spirits Council of the United
States is the national trade association of producers and marketers of dis-
tilled spirits. Thus, even after the NAB Code was repealed in 1983, the
203. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1304,
112 Stat. 2681, 2732-33 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6503).
204. KUNKEL & GANTZ, CARU REPORT, supra note 162, at 23.
205. For example, the FTC Staff Survey of Child-Oriented Commercial Web Sites in-
cluded sites for television networks, crafts, magazines, and books, as well as a variety of
sites oriented to young people such as KidsCom and Yahooligans Club.
206. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 5, at 40-41.
207. See TELEVISION CODE, supra note 105, at 10-12 ("The advertising of hard liquor
(distilled spirits) is not acceptable.").
208. The radio ban was adopted in 1936 and the television ban in 1948. The 1995
DISCUS Code of Good Practice defined the broadcast media to include cable and satellite.
Separate provisions prohibited advertising on the screen of motion picture theaters or
videotapes and prohibited paying compensation for advertising "plugs" on the broadcast
media.
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DISCUS Code prohibited advertising on radio and television stations as
well as on cable and satellite services.
In March 1996, Seagram, the second largest marketer of distilled
spirits, violated the Code of Practice by airing a liquor advertisement on a
small sports cable network. A few months later, it violated the ban again
by airing an advertisement on an ABC affiliate in Corpus Christi, Texas.
Instead of imposing sanctions, however, DISCUS voted in November 1996
210to repeal the voluntary prohibition. Competitive concerns as well as
changes in technologies had undermined industry support for the voluntary
ban.2 According to DISCUS's President, the association saw no basis for
allowing the broadcast advertising of beer and wine and not other alcoholic
212beverages. A Seagram's executive also pointed out that the ban on tele-
vision advertising no longer made sense when distilled spirits could be ad-
vertised on the Internet. 3
The members of DISCUS were undoubtedly aware of the Supreme
Court's decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island announced in May
2141996. That decision struck down a state law prohibiting the advertise-
ment of liquor prices. Because the law banned truthful commercial speech
about a lawful product, the Court reviewed it with "'special care.' 2' This
209. CODE OF GOOD PRACnCE FOR DISTILLED SPIRITS ADVERTISING AND MARKETING
(Distilled Spirits Council, 1995) [hereinafter DISCUS CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE]. Despite
these voluntary restrictions, some companies did seek to advertise hard liquor on television
once the NAB Code'was repealed. However, these advertisements were soon stopped in
response to public and congressional pressure. Linton, Self-Regulation in Broadcasting Re-
visited, supra note 86, at 484-85.
210. Stuart Elliott, Liquor Industry Ends Its Ad Ban in Broadcasting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 1996, at Al. Repeal of the voluntary ban was protested by various public health groups.
Two FCC Chairmen attempted to start proceedings to consider imposing a ban or other re-
strictions, but lacked the votes to proceed. A bill to prohibit the broadcasting of hard liquor
advertisements was introduced in Congress, but did not pass. Id.
211. "Liquor consumption [declined] 40% since its peak in 1979 as drinkers have
shifted to wine and beer." Denise Gellene, Seagram Bucks Voluntary Ban on TV Advertis-
ing with Spot on Cable, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at D3.
212. Elliott, supra note 210. Added another industry executive, "'The members of the
distilled-spirits industry have felt for many years that their competitive position has been
with one hand tied behind their back ... because they too would like access to a medium
they think would be very efficient for them."' Id.
213. Id. See generally CENTER FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, ALCOHOL & TOBACCO ON THE
WEB: NEW THREATS TO YOUTH (Mar. 1997) (describing Web sites promoting alcoholic bev-
erages) (on file with author).
214. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
215. Id. at 504. Although they employed different reasoning, all nine Justices found the
Rhode Island statute unconstitutional. Id.
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decision effectively removed the credible threat of government regula-
tion.
216
Although DISCUS repealed the ban on broadcast advertising, other
provisions of the DISCUS Code of Practice remained in effect. For exam-
ple, the Code cautioned that distilled spirits should be portrayed "in a re-
sponsible manner" and "should not be advertised or marketed in any man-
ner directed or primarily intended to appeal to persons below the legal
purchase age. 217 The Codes of Practice of the beer and wine industries
have similar provisions. Recently, however, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion has questioned the efficacy of some of these provisions. In August
1998, the FTC began an inquiry into the advertising practices of eight of
211the nation's top marketers of beer, wine, and liquor. It specifically
sought information about how the companies had implemented Code pro-
visions that prohibited advertising intended to appeal to or reach persons
below the legal drinking age.29
On the same date, the FTC filed a complaint and proposed consent
decree charging that advertisements for Beck's beer that depicted young
adults partying and drinking beer on a sail boat were "unfair acts or prac-
tices" in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The complaint noted that the advertisements were inconsistent with the
Beer Institute's Code because they portrayed boating passengers drinking
beer "while engaged in activities that require a high degree of alertness and
coordination to avoid falling overboard." 2 0 These recent actions by the
FTC suggest that the self-regulatory codes of the alcoholic beverages in-
dustry are not being effectively enforced.
2. Self-Regulation of News: The Press Councils
One type of media self-regulation that has clearly been unsuccessful
in the United States is the attempt to promote public accountability and
216. See generally Claudia MacLachlan, Law Murky on Stopping Liquor Ads, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 25, 1996, at Al. ("[M]any lawyers believe a ban on liquor ads would be deemed
unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision last May in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island.").
217. DISCUS CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 209.
218. Sally Beatty & John Simons, FTC Eyes Liquor Ads' Kid-Appeal, WALL ST. J., Aug.
7, 1998, at B1.
219. Order to File Special Report (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/
os/l998/9808/6(b)sptr.fin.htm> and <http:llwww.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/6(b)brre.fin.htm >.
220. Beck's North America, Inc., Complaint, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/l1998/
9808/9823092.cmp.htm>. See also Beck's North America, Inc., Agreement Containing
Consent Order, File No. 982-3092, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/l1998/
9808/9823092.agr.htm>; Alcohol Companies to Supply Data on Their Self-Regulatory Ac-
tivities to FTC (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.ftc. gov/opa/1998/9808/alcohol.htm>.
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fairness in news reporting by the use of a press council. Modeled after the
British Press Council, press councils were established in several states in
the late 1960s, and in 1973, the National News Council (NNC) was estab-
lished. However, the NNC closed in 1984, and by that time, most of the
state press councils had closed as well. 2 '
Patrick Brogan has done a detailed study of the NNC and the reasons
for its failure.m The idea of an NNC came out of a task force put together
by the Twentieth Century Fund in 1971. At the time, the press had been
under a great deal of attack, particularly by the Nixon Administration.223
According to Brogan, those who set up the NNC were concerned that if the
press failed to establish its own standards, public criticism would increase
to the point where pressure to change the freedoms enjoyed by the press
under the First Amendment could not be resisted.224
The NNC consisted of fifteen members representing both the public
and the media. It considered complaints against national newspapers, news
agencies, magazines, and television networks. Complainants would waive
their right to use any of the council's proceedings as evidence in court. 2
The NNC staff analyzed complaints and made initial judgments about their
merit. If a complaint was found to have merit, it was sent to a grievance
committee composed of members of the Council, which in turn, made rec-
226
ommendations to the full Council. The Council judged the cases and is-
sued verdicts. Over the decade of its existence, the NNC dealt with 227
227
complaints. Its decisions were made public, although not widely re-
221. The only surviving press council in the United States is in Minnesota. Minnesota
News Council (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.mtn.org/newscouncil>. However, press
councils are found in many other countries. One study reports that 48 countries have press
councils. K. TRWIR-A, THE PRESS COUNCIL: A SELF-REGULATORY MECHANISM FOR THE PRESS
2 (Bombay, Somaiya Publications Pvt. 1986). The first press council was established in
Sweden in 1916. Today, 12 countries in the European Union have press councils. See
EMMANUEL E. PARASCHOS, MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
NATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES ch. 9 (Ames: Iowa State University
Press 1998) (describing press councils in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
222. See generally PATRICK BROGAN, SPIKED: Tim SHORT LIFE AND DEATH OF THE
NATIONAL NEws COUNCIL (Priority Press Publications, N.Y. 1985) (A Twentieth Century
Fund Paper).
223. Id. at 10-12.
224. Id. at 4.
225. Id. at 6.
226. The NNC also considered matters of general journalistic ethics and attacks upon the
press from government, private interests, and individuals. Id. at 49-50, 53-54.
227. Brogan describes many of the cases as trivial, but asserts that over time, "the coun-
cil's rulings established a body of case law that made a useful contribution to journalistic
ethics and practice." Id. at 38.
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ported. It had no power of enforcement, but relied on publicity to en-
courage the press to mend its ways.
Brogan found that
[d]espite all its good intentions and ten years of strenuous endeavor,
the council was spumed by the press and neglected by the public.
Without press or public support, it could win no publicity. Without
that, it could not raise the money it needed to carry on operations-and
earn the support of press or public.229
From the beginning, the NNC faced vigorous opposition from a large seg-
ment of the press, including the New York Times, which viewed the NNC
as a threat to its First Amendment freedoms.230 Some press organizations
declined to cooperate with the Council. While over time the NNC gained
more support among the press, the industry was never willing to provide
financial support for its operations. 23'
Most of the funding for the NNC came from two foundations: the
Twentieth Century Fund and the Markle Foundation. Lack of sufficient
funding contributed to the problems faced by the NNC. To effectively re-
view whether a story had been reported fairly, the Council had to in effect
report a story, which required a large amount of resources and a staff of
experienced journalists capable of retracing and assessing the steps taken
by the original reporting team. Lacking funding for such an effort, the
• . . 233
NNC tended to rely upon graduate students to do its investigations. Lack
of funding also made it difficult for the NNC to pay high enough salaries
to attract high quality staff.2
In analyzing why the NNC has failed but the British Press Council
has succeeded, Brogan notes that "the situation is different in Britain. The
British Bill of Rights does not mention the press, and there is nothing to
228. For a time, its decisions were published in the Columbia Journalism Review. Id. at
47, 61. However, the failure to obtain wide dissemination of its operations is one of the rea-
sons contributing to the demise of the NNC. GANNETT CENTER FOR MEDIA STUDIES AND
SILHA CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF MEDIA ETHICS, MEDIA FREEDOM AND AccOUNTABILITY: A
CONFERENCE REPORT 27 (1988) [hereinafter GANNETT REPORT].
229. BROGAN, supra note 222, at 7.
230. Id. at 27-29.
231. Id. at28.
232. Id. at 21-22 & app. E. The failure of the NNC to obtain funding from the Ford
Foundation is also cited as one of the reasons contributing to its demise. Id. at 21. See also
GANNEr REPORT, supra note 228, at 24.
233. GANNETT REPORT, supra note 228, at 28.
234. BROGAN, supra note 222, at 45, 95.
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stop Parliament from imposing statutory control over the press should the
public ever insistently demand it.''235 Moreover, Brogan observes that
[t]he council was conceived in a period when the press was under
attack and feared that its enemies might carry the day and seriously re-
strict its freedom. In the event, the fears proved exaggerated. The press
easily survived Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew, and therefore never
saw any need for the dubious protection of the fledgling councl.2
Thus, without the threat of government regulation, effectively barred in the
United States by the First Amendment, members of the press saw no rea-
son to pay for or submit to outside reviews of their fairness.z 7
3. Comic Books
The comic book industry engaged in self-regulation after crime and
horror comics became popular in the 1950s, and many states passed laws
making it unlawful to distribute such comic books to minors.238 In 1954,
Congress held hearings about the effects of comic books on youth evi-
dencing concern about violence. While earlier attempts at self-regulation
had failed, the Association of Comic Magazine Publishers promised re-
newed action when the Senate began investigating. It adopted the Comics
Code and provided for the display of its seal of approval on comics that
met Code requirements.
This action had the desired effect, at least in the short to intermediate
term. The subcommittee decided not to recommend regulation of comic
books, but instead recommended reliance on industry self-regulation.
235. Id. at 6. Of course, there are other differences as well. Brogan notes that the British
Press Council started small and took a long time to become accepted. Id. at 90-91. More-
over, according to its Director, the British Press Council
enjoys two significant advantages that an American equivalent would be unlikely
to obtain. First, the targets of the Council's censure willingly publish the results
of the proceeding in full, prominently displayed, ... -something that few U.S.
publications, and probably no network news departments, would allow.... Sec-
ond, complainants to the Council are obliged to treat its proceedings as an alter-
native to libel litigation rather than a preliminary skirmish, and thus persuade
news organizations to open their books and cooperate, whereas in the litigious
United States a potential plaintiff would not ... sign away his rights, and there-
fore a potential defendant would likely resist all inquiries.
GANNET REPORT, supra note 228, at 27.
236. BROGAN, supra note 222, at 92.
237. See also Dennis, supra note 11. In this survey of self-regulation of the print media,
Dennis notes that because of the First Amendment, the print media have been virtually ex-
empt from regulation, and accountability has been a strictly voluntary affair.
238. Kevin W. Saunders, Media Self-Regulation of Depictions of Violence: A Last Op-
portunity, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 445, 446-47 (1994). Some of these statutes were found uncon-
stitutional.
239. Id. at 452.
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Many publishers of crime and horror comics went out of business because
wholesalers refused to distribute comics without a seal.m But after twenty
years, comic book violence began to make a comeback. Publishers found
they could avoid complying with the Code by shipping directly to specialty
stores.241 Even major publishers began to produce non-Code compliant
editions. Thus, over time, self-regulation of violence in comic books lost
its effectiveness.242
4. Motion Pictures
The 1930 Production Code of the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) resulted from public pressure, largely organized through
the Roman Catholic Church, to "clean up" movies. Like many other me-
dia industry codes, the Production Code contained both general provisions
and specific affirmative and negative provisions." The Production Code
proved quite successful because "[f]ilms without the Code Seal of Ap-
proval were doomed to failure" since the theaters, which were mostly
owned by major studios, would not exhibit films without the MPAA
seal."
240. Id. (citing Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Ex-
pression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-from Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33
WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 793 (1992)).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 452-53. Saunders notes that even though "the level of crime, horror and vio-
lence in present day comics is as bad today as it was in 1955," and some public concern has
been expressed, the issue appears to be of less concern than in the 1950s. Id. at 452. He at-
tributes the lesser concern to "the availability of violent images in so many other media"
that "make comic book violence not seem so bad." Id. at 453.
243. Roy Eugene Bates, Private Censorship of Movies, 22 STAN. L. REv. 618, 619
(1970).
244. For example, under the first section, General Principles, it is stated that the "motion
picture has special Moral obligations." The Motion Picture Code of 1930, reprinted in
HOLLYwOOD's AMERICA: UNrrED STATES HISTORY THROUGH ITS FILMS 142, 144 (Steven
Mintz & Randy Roberts eds., 1993). The second section, Working Principles, states that
"[n]o picture should lower the moral standards of those who see it." Id. at 145. Specific
provisions address such topics as the portrayal of sin and evil, adultery, vulgarity, dance,
and religion. For example, the subject of adultery should be avoided and is never a fit sub-
ject for comedy. When it is portrayed in serious drama, it should not appear justified or pre-
sented as attractive or alluring. Id. at 147.
245. Bates, supra note 243, at 619. In its first 30 years, 25,000 films, including 12,000
full-length features were reviewed by the Code Office. Producers would submit scripts,
which would be read by at least two members of the staff to determine whether they met the
Code. The staff met daily to discuss problems. They would send written decisions to the
producer, including suggestions as to how any problems might be solved. Finished films
were also reviewed by the Code staff. Appeals could be made to a review board. It appears
that most difficulties were worked out by making changes. See generally Self-Policing of
the Movie and Publishing Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Postal Operations of
the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 86th Cong. 28-30 (1960) (statement of
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Several factors have been identified as contributing to the success of
the Production Code in dictating content during the 1930s and 1940s.2 2
First, there was little competition from other forms of entertainment. 47
Second, the oligopolistic structure of the movie industry enabled the
MPAA-member companies to enforce the Code. 8 Third, the Code was in-
sulated from constitutional challenge by the position of the Supreme Court
that movies were not entitled to First Amendment protection.
After World War II, circumstances changed. The public demanded
more realistic films. Television started competing with the movies. These
developments created pressure to break away from Code-imposed stan-
dards. In addition, the Paramount case altered the industry structure and
loosened the hold of the studios, which made enforcement difficult.2 0 The
number of independently produced movies increased, and starting in 1952,
the Supreme Court came to recognize motion pictures as a form of expres-
• • 251 ..
sion protected by the First Amendment. With this decision, as one com-
mentator noted, "the main reason for movie industry self-regulation-fear
of governmental censorship-almost disappeared." 252
As the Code lost most of its effectiveness in limiting film content and
movies became more explicit in the treatment of nudity and sex in the
1960s, the public demanded government control. In 1965, the City of Dal-
las enacted the first movie classification ordinance designed solely to pro-
tect children. Although the Supreme Court overturned the ordinance, dic-
tum in its decision supported the use of an age-classification scheme.25
These developments convinced MPAA officials that industry self-
regulation would have to take the form of an age-classification system to
prevent a flood of new censorial statutes. Motion Picture Association of
America President Jack Valenti met with leaders of industry and outside
Geoffrey M. Shurlock, Director, Production Code Administration, Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America).
246. Bates, supra note 243, at 619-20.
247. Id. at 619.
248. IL at 619-20.
249. Id. at 620; Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 243-45
(1915), overruled in part by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
250. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). In this case, the Su-
preme Court found that the ownership of the majority of movie theaters by the major stu-
dios violated the Sherman Act, and it ordered the dissolution of this monopoly.
251. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. 495.
252. Bates, supra note 243, at 621.
253. Interstate Cir., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968).
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parties to revise the Code.2M The rating system that grew out of this proc-
ess took effect in 1968, and remains substantially unchanged today.
Under the MPAA rating systems all films produced or distributed by
MPAA members are submitted to the ratings board for rating.255 Nonmem-
bers may also submit films to be rated. Preliminary ratings are based on
the script, while final judgment is reserved until the film is viewed. Pro-
ducers unhappy with their rating may appeal. While no one is required to
obtain a rating, most producers do so because approximately 85 percent of
256theaters cooperate with the MPAA. Films that are not rated or are rated
with an X rating (now called NC-17) find their opportunities for distribu-
tion limited.257
5. Video Games
Another medium where a rating scheme has been utilized is video
games.2 Senator Lieberman became concerned about violent video
games, such as Mortal Kombat. In December 1993, Senators Lieberman
and Kohl convened hearings where they proposed legislation establishing
an independent agency to oversee development of voluntary industry stan-
dards.259 On the day of the hearings, the Software Publishers Association,
the largest trade association in the computer software sector, announced its
intent to create its own rating and warning system that would meet the
260
elements specified by Senator Lieberman.
The industry commissioned the development of a self-rating sys-
261tem. The nonprofit Recreational Software Advisory Council (RSAC)
was formed to administer the rating system. Its bylaws require that a ma-
262jority of its board members come from outside the industry. Software
makers using RSAC's self-rating scheme must sign a contract that permits,
among other things, RSAC to require corrective labeling, consumer and
254. For Jack Valenti's description of how the ratings system came about and how it
works, see Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F. Supp. 1328, 1335-38 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
255. For a description of the MPAA rating scheme and how films are rated, see Richard
P. Salgado, Regulating a Video Revolution, 7 YALEL. & POL'Y REV. 516, 519-20 (1989).
256. Swope, 560 F. Supp. at 1338.
257. Salgado, supra note 255, at 523-25 (describing obstacles faced by X-rated films).
See generally Jacob Septimus, Note, The MPAA Ratings System: A Regime of Private Cen-
sorship and Cultural Manipulation, 21 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 69 (1996).
258. Balkam, supra note 31, at 139. See also Saunders, supra note 238, at 458.
259. Balkam, supra note 31, at 139.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 140 (describing how self-rating works).
262. According to Stephen Balkam, Executive Director of RSAC, outside board mem-
bers were "a vital part of its early success that the organization could be seen to be fair, bal-
anced and not unduly influenced by game makers." Id. at 140.
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press advisories, product recalls, and monetary fines. 263 Spot checks and
audits are performed by the Psychology Department at Yale.264 Disputes
265
over ratings may be addressed by the RSAC Appeals Committee.
Although use of the RSAC rating system is voluntary, Balkam sug-
gests that video game companies feel compelled to rate or face limited op-
portunities for distribution. Under pressure from members of Congress,
WalMart, Toys R Us, and other retailers announced they would only stock
266
rated games. Balkam concludes that "[t]hrough a process of carrot and
stick, the government has ensured that the industry has 'voluntarily' im-
posed a regulatory rating scheme upon itself without the need of a dedi-
cated government department and all the expenditure required to bring one
into place.
' 267
6. Television Violence: Ratings and the V-Chip
A somewhat similar approach-that of ratings-was recently imple-
mented to address violent and sexual content on television. After the fail-
ure of the Family Viewing Policy,269 many efforts were made to reduce
269
violent and sexual content on television. Unlike video games, however,
Congress eventually did pass legislation that provided for a voluntary rat-
ing scheme. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 mandates that televi-
sion sets be equipped with a chip that will permit programs with certain
ratings to be blocked. It gave the industry one year to come up with
"voluntary rules for rating video programming that contains sexual, vio-
lent, or other indecent materials about which parents should be informed
before it is displayed to children" and to agree "voluntarily to broadcast
signals that contain ratings of such programming."' 27' If the industry failed
to develop rules acceptable to the FCC, the FCC was required to establish
an advisory committee to recommend a rating system; to prescribe guide-
lines and procedures for rating video programs; and to require stations to
. 272




266. Id. at 141. Balkam notes that Senator Lieberman and Senator Kohl wrote to major
retail outlets and held a press conference praising those who agreed and criticizing others.
267. Id.
268. See supra Part mII.A.3.c(ii).
269. See MacCarthy, supra note 50, at 685-95.
270. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(d), 110 Stat. 56, 141 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
330(c)(1)-(4) (Supp. II 1996)).
271. Id. § 551(e)(1)(A), (B), 110 Stat. at 142 (emphasis added).
272. Id.
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Regarding the statutory language, Professor J.M. Balkin notes:
The Act's "fail-safe" provision deliberately stops short of requiring
that broadcasters accept the ratings system devised by the advisory
committee. It requires only that, if video programming already is rated
by the broadcaster, the rating must also be encoded so that it can be
read by a V-Chip system.
273
The Act's
fail-safe provision is left deliberately toothless to avoid constitutional
problems of prior restraint and compelled speech. Instead, the true goal
of the legislation is to present broadcasters with a set of unpalatable
alternatives. If they do nothing, they risk the appointment of an advi-
sory committee telling them how to rate their programs. Even if the
FCC cannot constitutionally require that they accept the ratings system
as a condition of broadcasting, there will be enormous public pressure
on broadcasters to accept a system that has already been worked out
with attendant public fanfare. Faced with this possibility, broadcasters
and distributors will instead choose to create their own ratings sys-274
tem.
In fact, they did.275 As the one-year deadline approached, the movie,
broadcast, and cable industries-as represented by the MPAA, NAB, and
National Cable Television Association (NCTA)-jointly developed a rat-
ing system based in large part upon the existing system for rating motion
276 . 277pictures. After public and congressional opposition, the proposal was
273. J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regula-
tion, 45 DuKEL.J. 1131, 1157 (1996).
274. Id. at 1158.
275. Although television executives initially threatened to challenge the V-Chip legisla-
tion in court, they agreed to develop an industry rating system after a White House summit
in February 1996. Paul Farhi & John F. Harris, TV Industry Agrees to Use Rating System,
WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1996, at Al. Noting that the industry had been forced to act at the
White House Summit because of the V-Chip legislation, Ted Turner reportedly said, "'Let's
be honest; this is not voluntary."' Richard Zoglin, Prime-Time Summit, TIME, Mar. 11,
1996, at 64, 66.
276. Letter from Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, et al.,
to William F. Caton, Secretary, FCC (Jan. 17, 1997), available at <http://www.fcc.gov
/Bureaus/Cable/PublicNotices/1997/fcc97034.txt>.
277. For example, Senator Hollings introduced the Children's Protection from Violent
Programming Act on February 26, 1997, to make it unlawful "to distribute... violent video
programming not blockable by electronic means specifically on the basis of its violent con-
tent during hours when children are reasonably likely to comprise a substantial portion of
the audience." 143 CONG. REc. S1670, S1671 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1997) (emphasis added).
This bill would also have given the FCC the right to revoke a license for failure to rate
based on violent content. Id. at S1670-71 (statement of Sen. Hollings). Senator Coats also
introduced legislation to authorize the FCC not to grant or renew a license unless the net-
work used a content descriptive rating system. 143 CONG. REc. S4015, S4016 (daily ed.
May 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. Coats). To fend off legislation of this type, the industry,
except for NBC, agreed to changes in the industry-proposed rating system. Regarding the
changes, MPAA President Jack Valenti said, "'[tihis is not something we celebrated as a
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revised. The FCC found the revised rating scheme to be acceptable, and
. • .. 278
thus there was no need to convene an advisory committee.
It is too early to assess whether this system is going to be successful
in meeting the stated goal of providing parents with effective tools to su-
pervise their children's viewing of inappropriate content.279 However, it is
an interesting example of where self-regulation may be preferable to gov-
ernment regulation because government regulation would raise constitu-
tional difficulties. Indeed, some have questioned whether the industry de-
cision to utilize ratings is sufficiently voluntary to avoid constitutionalproblems .28o
IV. ANALYSIS
The examples discussed above include a broad range of self-
regulatory efforts involving the media. They provide some support for the
claimed advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation as well as general
support for Michael's hypotheses about the conditions needed for effective
great victory... [t]his is something we did because we had to do it."' Paige Albiniak, Rat-
ings Get Revamped, BRDCST. & CABLE, July 14, 1997, at 4.
278. Implementation of Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Video
Programming Ratings, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 8232, paras. 18-26, 11 Comm. Reg.
(P & F) 934 (1998) [hereinafter Implementation Report and Order]. The proposal was re-
vised in response to public protest that the original proposal failed to provide adequate in-
formation to parents about the type of objectionable content. 1d. paras. 12-17. The compro-
mise reached after negotiations was to retain the age-based categories but to add content
descriptions. Thus, for example, instead of rating a program simply TV-PG, the rating
might include V indicating moderate violence, S indicating some sexual situation, L indi-
cating infrequent coarse language, or D for some suggestive dialog. Id. para. 7. Most of the
major industry players except NBC and Black Entertainment Television (BET) agreed to go
along with the revised rating system. Id. para. 30.
279. The full effect cannot properly be assessed until a significant number of television
sets equipped with the V-Chip are in use, which will not occur for some time. The FCC has
required television manufacturers to include blocking technology on at least half of their
sets with a screen 13 inches or larger by July 1999, and the rest by January 2000. Technical
Requirements to Enable Blocking of Video Programming Based on Program Ratings, Re-
port and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,248, para. 23, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 907 (1998). Once
television sets with V-Chips are available, it will still take years for people to replace their
old sets. Initial sales have been slow. Marta W. Aldrich, Parents Slow to Embrace V-Chip,
AssOciATED PRESs, Feb. 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 11924613. However, a recent study
by the Kaiser Family Foundation does suggest some problems. DALE KUNKEL Er AL.,
RATING THE TV RATINGS: ONE YEAR OUT, AN ASsESsMENT OF THE TELEVISION INDUSTRY'S
USE OF V-CHIP RATINGS (Kaiser Family Foundation 1998). For example, it found that
"[p]arents cannot rely on the content descriptors, as currently employed, to effectively block
all shows containing violence, sexual material, or adult language." Id. at 89.
280. See, e.g., Corn-Revere, supra note 13, at 64-65 (arguing that industry acceptance of
ratings is not voluntary due to congressional threats to adopt even less palatable legislation
and because broadcasters must seek license renewal from the FCC).
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self-regulation. In addition, they provide a basis for assessing the proposed
use of self-regulation for digital television and online privacy.
A. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Self-Regulation
The examples discussed above do not provide a great deal of support
for the claimed advantages of self-regulation. At best, some, such as the
video games example, illustrate the ability of self-regulatory organizations
to act more quickly than government. But on the other hand, in the case of
protecting children's privacy on the Internet, it has taken some time for the
industry to act, and the government presumably could have acted more
quickly but preferred to wait to give industry a chance to fix the problem
first.
Some examples also suggest that self-regulation can result in the
costs of regulation being borne by the industry instead of the government.
Examples might include the NAB Code"' and the CARU Advertising
Guidelines. The examples also supply limited support for the claim that
self-regulation can be used where direct government regulation would
raise constitutional problems. For example, it has been argued that the
MPAA rating scheme would be unconstitutional if imposed by the gov-
212
ernment. However, the experience with the Family Viewing Policy sug-
gests limits to what the government can do to encourage self-regulation
without turning voluntary action into state actionJ2 The V-Chip example
presents a case where the voluntary nature of the self-regulation is ques-
tionable.2 4
Another benefit of self-regulation is that it can provide a forum forS,• 285
testing rules that may ultimately become regulations. For example, the
NAB Code's limits on children's advertising formed the basis for the Chil-
286dren's Television Act's limit on advertising. Similarly, the FTC's legis-
lative proposals regarding children's privacy seemed to draw upon the
287CARU self-regulatory guidelines.
The examples also support some arguments against self-regulation.
Some examples suggest that inadequate enforcement may be a problem
281. Running the Code Authority accounted for approximately 14% of the NAB's
budget. Maddox & Zanot, supra note 53, at 130. When the Code was abandoned, however,
it appears that most of the enforcement costs were shifted to the networks and stations
rather than to the government. Id. at 128-30.
282. Bates, supra note 243, at 625; Septimus, supra note 257, at 86-87.
283. See supra Part II.A.3.c(ii).
284. See supra Part III.C.6.
285. Mulligan & Goldman, supra note 30, at 65-67.
286. See supra Part mI.A.3.c.
287. See supra note 202.
[Vol. 51
SELF-REGULATION AND THE MEDIA
under self-regulation. There are few examples of the NAB taking any ac-
tion against television stations that violated the Code. The Children's Ad-
vertising Review Unit brings only a small number of cases each year
against television advertisers, even though evidence suggests that hundreds
of noncompliant advertisements are broadcast each week. And more re-
cently, CARU has only concluded a few cases involving Web sites that
collect information from children, even though the FTC has documented
that a large number of Web sites are not in compliance with the CARU
Guidelines.
Inadequate sanctions also presented a problem in some cases. For ex-
ample, denial of the right to display the NAB seal did not provide a mean-
ingful sanction for broadcast stations. Finally, the DOJ's antitrust suit
against the NAB illustrates how self-regulation can result in anticompeti-
tive conduct.
28
B. Conditions in Which Self-Regulation Can Work
There are many ways in which one might measure the "success" of
self-regulatory schemes. It might be measured in terms of whether the self-
regulation meets the stated goals or whether the stated goals are the correct
or best goals. Likewise, self-regulation could be considered successful
when it meets other (perhaps unstated) industry objectives, such as
"avoiding intrusive government regulation" or restricting competition,
even when those goals may not benefit the public.
For purposes of this Article, the focus is on whether self-regulatory
codes have been successful in achieving their stated purposes. At least
some of the above examples of self-regulatory schemes involving the me-
dia have enjoyed success in that way. Indeed, in some cases, voluntary
codes have been in effect for a long period of time. Among the successful
(or at least partially successful) examples of self-regulation are the NAB
commercial time limits, including the NAB's children's advertising limits,
the NAB's Family Viewing Policy, CARU's Advertising Guidelines,
DISCUS's prohibition on broadcast advertising, the MPAA Production
Code, the MPAA rating scheme, and the Comic Book Code. Yet, of these
arguably successful schemes, only two--the CARU advertising limits and
the MPAA rating scheme-remain in effect. The NAB commercial time
limits were found to have raised antitrust problems; the Family Viewing
Policy was found unconstitutional; the NAB's children's advertising limits
were repealed and ultimately replaced by a statute; DISCUS has rescinded
its ban on broadcast advertising; the MPAA Production Code has been re-
288. See supra Part I.A.2.
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placed by a rating system; and the Comic Book Code seems to have lost its
effectiveness.
Among the unsuccessful self-regulatory schemes are the NAB's early
attempt to regulate frequency assignments, the NAB's attempt to limit
cigarette advertising, the NAB's attempt to encourage diverse cultural and
educational programming for children, and the NNC's attempt to promote
fairness in news coverage. The Children's Advertising Review Unit's at-
tempt to protect children's online privacy has largely been ineffective as
well; however, it may achieve greater success over time.89
What are some of the factors that may account for these successes
and failures? First, these examples are used to test the four criteria identi-
• 290
fled by Michael. Second, they suggest an additional factor that may in-
fluence the success or failure of self-regulatory schemes.
1. Industry Incentives and Expertise
Michael hypothesized that for self-regulation to be successful, the
self-regulatory body must have both the expertise and motivation to per-
form the self-regulation. The media examples support this hypothesis. In
most examples, a major motivating factor was fear that if the industry
failed to act on its own, the government would regulate.291 Where the threat
of government regulation receded-as in the case of the National News
Council-self-regulation failed. Further, in cases where the credible threat
of governmental regulation disappeared, so did the self-regulation. For ex-
ample, the NAB decided to abandon the entire Code instead of simply
eliminating the sections challenged in the antitrust suit because it was clear
that the FCC was no longer interested in regulating broadcast content. 2
289. Several other schemes-video games and the V-Chip-are too new to assess. Al-
though the content provisions of the alcoholic beverages industry codes have been in exis-
tence for some time, the Author is not aware of any studies of their effectiveness. The
FTC's current investigation may shed some light on this question.
290. See supra Part ll.D.
291. Some of the media examples demonstrate that the failure of self-regulation does in
fact lead to government regulation. For example, the NAB's inability to voluntarily work
out frequency assignments led to the Radio Act of 1927, under which the FCC awarded li-
censes for specific frequencies. Likewise, the failure of the NAB and the tobacco industry
to restrict cigarette advertising contributed to the passage of a law prohibiting broadcast ad-
vertising. Repeal of the NAB Code provisions limiting the amount of children's advertising
led to a law limiting the amount of advertising. However, the converse is not necessarily
true-that is, that successful self-regulation will obviate the need for government regula-
tion. See infra Part IV.B.2.
292. See supra Part ll.A.2.
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Likewise, CARU's efforts to police children's advertising have varied de-
pending on the intensity of governmental interest.
29 3
In the above examples, the threat of government regulation was due
to a change in the political climate. In other cases, legal constraints have
mitigated the possibility of government regulation. For example, following
the Supreme Court decision granting First Amendment protection to mo-
tion pictures, the Movie Production Code fell apart.294 Similarly,
DISCUS's decision to eliminate the prohibition on advertising distilled
spirits followed the Supreme Court's decision in 44 Liquonart 5
Economics is another important incentive. One might explain the ef-
fect of the NAB's limitation on cigarette advertising by looking at broad-
casters' advertising revenues. The limitations on the amount of advertising
per hour and the number of products advertised in a single spot increased
broadcasters' revenues by raising the price of advertising time, while lim-
its on cigarette advertising would have cut into advertising revenues. Yet,
economic incentives cannot provide the sole explanation, for surely the
NAB's and DISCUS's prohibition on advertising distilled spirits also had
296the effect of reducing advertising revenues. Ultimately, the distilled
spirits industry's perceived need to advertise in order to regain market
share lost to beer and wine resulted in the failure of self-regulation.
Economic incentives can sometimes combine with altruism as a mo-
tive for self-regulation. For example, in the case of the Family Viewing
Hour, the district court found that CBS genuinely wished to reduce vio-
lence on its network, but did not want to act alone because it would suffer
competitive harm. 7
Michael argues that industry must not only be willing to self-
regulate, but it must possess the requisite expertise. Lack of expertise pre-
sented a problem in only one of the media examples-the National News
293. Not only did Armstrong's study indicate that CARU's efforts correlated with the
degree of governmental interest, but CARU increased its activities regarding online adver-
tising when it became clear that the FTC was considering action in this area. See supra Part
1I.B.1-2.
294. See supra Part II.A.2.
295. See supra Part llI.C.l.
296. The different treatment of alcohol and tobacco advertising may be attributed to
historical differences in how these products have been perceived by the public. The experi-
ence of Prohibition suggests that large segments of the public have traditionally disap-
proved of alcohol consumption, while smoking was not generally viewed as undesirable
until the Surgeon General's Report publicized the health risks in the 1960s.
297. See supra Part uI.A.3.c(ii). In advocating for protection of children online, the
Author sometimes heard similar arguments from industry representatives. They would say
that they wanted to protect children, but were afraid that their competition would not, and
the "good guys" would suffer in the marketplace.
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Council. One of the factors contributing to the NNC's demise was its reli-
ance on inexperienced graduate students to conduct investigations. Of
course, this lack of expertise was directly related to the lack of funds,
which in turn was due to the lack of motivation within the industry."'
The NNC also provides the only media example where there was no
preexisting organization willing to take on the self-regulation. The lack of
a preexisting organization may have been a contributing factor to its fail-
ure since the new organization was unable to establish a sufficient source
299
of funding. In the other media examples, whether successful or not, a
trade association was already in existence, although, in some cases-
CARU and RSAC-the trade association created a separate unit or organi-
zation to actually carry out the self-regulation.
Thus, the examples of self-regulation of the media support the hy-
pothesis that industry motivation is essential to successful self-regulation.
If the source of that motivation is removed or weakened, then self-
regulation is likely to falter.
2. Agency Ability to Audit
Michael's second hypothesis-that agency staff must have the
authority and expertise to audit the self-regulatory activity-applies spe-
cifically to the type of self-regulation he was interested in, that is, audited
self-regulation by federal agencies.30 While none of the media examples
involved audited self-regulation, they suggest that even where self-
regulation is not required by a federal agency, it is more effective where a
federal agency has authority to regulate and is available to enforce rules
against the noncompliant.
The "successful" instances of self-regulation generally involved
situations where there was some government regulation. For example,
NAB's implementation of advertising limits was supported by the fact that
the FCC looked at the number of commercials in renewing licenses. 0'
Similarly, the Children's Advertising Review Unit's efforts to deter unfair
and deceptive advertising to children were backed up by FTC (and some-
times FCC) enforcement actions.3°2 The recent FTC case against Beck's
similarly suggests that the FTC is willing to enforce restrictions on alcohol
advertising where the industry fails to adequately police itself.'03 Thus,
298. See supra Part III.C.2.
299. See supra Part II.C.2.
300. See supra Part lI.D.
301. See supra Part HI.A.3.b.
302. See supra Part HI.B.1.
303. See supra Part III.C.1.
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having a government agency with authority to regulate as a backup appears
to be an important factor in successful self-regulation.
3. Objective v. Subjective Standards
Michael hypothesized greater success where rules were relatively
narrow and susceptible to output-based standards and found that programs
with the most subjective standards experienced the most difficulty in im-
plementation. Again, the media examples confirm this finding. When Code
requirements were vague and subjective, compliance was less likely than
when they were concrete and measurable. For example, the FCC's Chil-
dren's Television Task Force found that most stations complied with the
NAB's children's advertising limits, which could be measured in terms of
minutes per hour, but did not comply with the more subjective obligation
to provide a variety of educational and cultural programming.304 Similarly,
compliance with an outright ban on the broadcast of advertising distilled
spirits is easily determined. These examples generally support the conclu-
sion that self-regulation is more successful when the regulation is suscep-
tible to output-based standards.
4. Fair Process and Public Participation
Michael argued that to enhance the likelihood of success,
[t]he self-regulatory organization should engage in its rulemaking on
the record, with notice and opportunity for comment given to all af-
fected groups to the extent possible, with particular emphasis on notice
to nonmembers who might be adversely affected by the proposed rule,
and responses to all significant comments required in the rulemaking
record.30
Most of the media examples did not engage in "rule making" on the
record with notice and opportunity to affected groups. Indeed, in many
media examples, there appears to be little public awareness of the self-
regulation, much less public involvement in the rulemaking and enforce-
ment processes. For example, the NAB does not appear to have consulted
with viewers or consumers in developing or amending the Code nor to
304. TASK FORCE REPORT, VOL. 1, supra note 136, at 4. See also Policies and Rules
Concerning Children's Television Programming, Notice of Inquiry, 8 F.C.C.R. 1841, para.
7, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2291 (1993) (noting compliance with "specific, palpable per-
formance standards" for children's advertising but little improvement concerning vague
program obligations).
305. Michael, supra note 16, at 245. He also argues that in enforcement activities, the
self-regulatory organization should provide notice and opportunity for a hearing before an
impartial decision maker who is required to decide on the record. Id. The media examples,
such as the NAB Code, CARU Guidelines, and the movie ratings, seemed to comply with
these procedural safeguards.
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have encouraged or accepted complaints from the public.3°6 Indeed, most
of its enforcement was done behind closed doors. Moreover, the public
was largely unaware of the NAB seal. It is impossible to know whether
this lack of public awareness and participation affected the NAB's effec-
tiveness.
The Children's Advertising Review Unit's mode of operation is
similar to the NAB's, although it occasionally acts on complaints from the
public, makes some effort to publicize its actions, has an academic advi-
sory board, and consults with nonindustry groups from time to time.' 7 The
industry groups that developed the V-Chip rating scheme-MPAA, NAB,
and NCTA-were criticized for developing the initial rating scheme with-
out sufficient input from the public,"° but did eventually meet with the
groups and added representatives of the public to their advisory board.' °9
Other self-regulatory groups have included nonindustry representa-
tion. A majority of the members on the RSAC, which developed video
game ratings, comes from outside the video game industry.310 Moreover,
the NNC consisted of members drawn from both the public and the jour-
nalism profession and was chaired by a member of the public. Yet, despite
this public involvement, the NNC's failure was attributed in large part to
its failure to obtain widespread public awareness and support.1 On the
other hand, the success of movie ratings has depended upon widespread
public awareness and support.1 2
In sum, the media examples are inconclusive on whether public par-
ticipation in rule making and enforcement is important for effective self-
regulation. Some have enjoyed success without public participation while
others have failed even with public participation.
306. Several articles commented on the public's lack of awareness of the NAB Code and
the muted public response to its repeal. See, e.g., Maddox & Zanot, supra note 53, at 125.
307. See supra Part llI.B.1. Members of CARU's academic advisory group are listed on
its Web page. Some of the organizations the Author represents met with CARU representa-
tives to comment on the draft guidelines for online media.
308. See, e.g., Jube Shiver, Jr., TV Industry to Use Ratings Before Regulatory Review,
L.A. TRIms, Dec. 19, 1996, at Al; Jenny Hontz & Christopher Stern, D.C. Goes Rating-
Baiting, VARETY, Feb. 24-Mar. 2, 1997.
309. Implementation Report and Order, supra note 278, paras. 12-16.
310. Balkam, supra note 31, at 140. Whether RSAC is ultimately successful, will, as in
the case of the V-Chip, depend on whether it can earn the public's knowledge and trust.
311. See supra Part LlI.C.2. Moreover, Brogan attributes some of the NNC's problems to
the requirement that it be chaired by a member of the public. BROGAN, supra note 222, at
17. He found that the only effective chairman was one that came from a journalism back-
ground, who, because of his background, was able to command the respect of the media and
be effective in fund-raising. Id. at 47.
312. See Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F. Supp. 1328, 1340-41 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (describing
public awareness and use of movie ratings based on surveys).
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5. Other Conditions
The media examples also suggest that the size and structure of the in-
dustry are important factors in the success of self-regulation. Logic sug-
gests that the fewer industry participants, the easier it would be to self-
regulate. The media examples also indicate that the existence of market
power may play a role in being able to effectively enforce industry self-
regulation.
The NAB enjoyed success in limiting the amount and kind of adver-
tising, even though there was a large number of advertisers and advertising
agencies, because the number of television stations was limited, and most
belonged to one of three major networks. Since access to the network af-
filiates, most of whom complied with the NAB Code, was essential to
reach the majority of markets, advertisers had a strong incentive to comply
with the Code.13 Similarly, there are only a small number of movie stu-
dios. When they controlled the majority of movie theaters, they could en-
sure that the theaters showed only films meeting the Production Code.314
The success CARU has achieved with television commercials com-
pared to Web sites may also be due to the structure of those industries. The
number of companies that advertise to children on television is fairly lim-
ited. However, the number of companies offering Web sites to children is
quite large and includes many new entrants as well as the traditional ce-
315
real, toy, and fast food companies. Thus, additional factors affecting the
success of self-regulation are the number of industry participants and
whether there are dominant players that can use their market power to en-
force self-regulatory provisions. With these factors in mind, this Article
now analyzes the two recent proposals for self-regulatory initiatives-
digital television and online privacy.
C. Implications for Digital Television
The Advisory Committee has recommended adoption of a Model
Voluntary Code of Conduct for Digital Television Broadcasters. The Advi-
sory Committee explains the reasons for its recommendation:
A new industry statement of principles updating the 1952 Code
would have many virtues. The most significant one is that it would en-
able the broadcasting industry to identify the high standards of public
313. While advertisers could always find non-Code stations to carry their commercials,
"faced with the choice of abiding by the Code or incurring the expense and possible public
relations headaches of making two sets of ads for Code and non-Code stations, advertisers
generally chose the former." Rotfeld et al., supra note 107, at 19.
314. See supra Part III.C.4.
315. See supra Part I.B.2.
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service that most stations follow and that represent the ideals and his-
toric traditions of the industry. A new set of standards can help coun-
teract short-term pressures that have been exacerbated by the incredi-
bly competitive landscape broadcasters now face, particularly when
compared to the first 30-some years of the television era. Those com-
petitive pressures can lead to less attention to public issues and com-
munity concerns. A renewed statement of principles can make salient
and keep fresh general aspirations that can easily be lost in the hectic• 316
atmosphere and pressures of day-to-day operations.
Unlike the old NAB Code, the Model Voluntary Code does not ad-
dress advertising.3 7 Apart from this change, the Model Voluntary Code
closely tracks the old NAB Television Code. Both include sections ad-
dressing responsibility toward children, the treatment of news and public
events, community responsibility, controversial public issues, and special
318program standards (violence, drugs, gambling, etc.). Unlike the old NAB
Television Code, the Model Voluntary Code does not contain a section on
religious programming, but has new sections on covering elections and re-
sponsibility toward individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing.319
Like the old NAB Television Code, the Model Voluntary Code pro-
vides for the position of Code Authority Director and a Television Code
Review Board. While the NAB's work in the past was largely conducted in
316. PIAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 46. In a draft of this section of the report, Professor
Sunstein makes similar arguments in support of a voluntary code:
The principle virtue is that it enables the broadcasting industry to identify and to
adhere to high standards of public service, standards that are already followed by
many (though not all) stations, and that are consistent with the best historical tra-
ditions of the industry. A code can help counteract short-term pressures that can
lead to less attention to public issues, less and worse programming for children,
and more sensationalism and prurience than is desirable. A code can also identify
and help promote general aspirations that can sometimes be lost in day-to-day op-
erations. Because a code involves self-regulation, it has the distinctive advantage
of not permitting government officials to be in the business of making decisions
about television content.
CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, APPENDIX B: VOLUNTARY CODE OF
CONDUCT 2-3 (draft Sept. 4, 1998) (citation omitted) (on file with author) [hereinafter PIAC
DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT].
317. Presumably, this was done in part to avoid any antitrust issues. See PIAC REPORT,
supra note 1, at 120-21 (explaining why the Model Code is unlikely to be found to violate
antitrust laws).
318. Within these sections, some changes have been made. For example, the section on
Responsibilities Toward Children in the Model Voluntary Code, which states that "[e]ach
broadcaster should endeavor to provide a reasonable amount of educational programming
for children each week," PIAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 107, is somewhat more specific
than the old NAB Code's statement that "[b]roadcasters have a special responsibility to
children. Programs designed primarily for children should take into account the range of
interests and needs of children from instructional and cultural material to a wide variety of
entertainment material." TELEVISION CODE, supra note 105, at 3.
319. PIAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 107-08, 112.
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private, the Advisory Committee has made several recommendations de-
signed to invite public and governmental awareness and participation. It
urges the NAB to draft the Code with input from community and public
interest leaders.320 Moreover, the proposed Model Voluntary Code pro-
vides for "special public recognition" to stations with an excellent public
service record.32' It also would require that the FCC be informed at license
renewal time whether or not a station is in compliance with the Code, al-
though this notation is to "lack any legal force or effect."322 In addition, the
Television Code Review Board is to "report to the public the names of
complying, noncomplying, and specially commended stations" and "report
continuing or egregious violations of the code to Congress, the public, and
FCC on an ongoing basis."
323
There are three reasons to be skeptical about the Advisory Commit-
tee's recommendation for a voluntary code. First, it is unclear whether the
NAB will follow it. Second, even if the NAB does adopt a voluntary code
along the lines suggested by the Advisory Committee, it is doubtful that
the code will be effective in achieving the stated goals. Finally, the Model
Voluntary Code raises similar questions regarding voluntariness that could
cause it to be subject to constitutional challenge.
The initial reaction of many broadcasters was to oppose adoption of a
voluntary code.324 After the Advisory Committee discussed the proposed
voluntary code in the summer of 1998, Broadcasting & Cable reported
that "[w]hile broadcasters hate the idea of any so-called voluntary code of
conduct, the NAB board decided.., to proceed with caution-for now.
' 325
After a "robust" discussion on whether to strongly oppose such a plan, the
Board yielded to arguments not to oppose the Code before it was even rec-
ommended. Instead, the Board passed a resolution expressing "serious
concern" regarding any government efforts to impose limits on broadcast-
ers' editorial freedom.326 At its January 1999 board meeting, the Board
320. Id. at47.
321. Id. at 113.
322. Id. at 114.
323. Id.
324. At the Advisory Committee meeting on September 9, 1998, some members sought
unsuccessfully to get the NAB's reactions to the proposed voluntary code on record. Advi-
sory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, Morning
Session 38-43 (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http:llwww.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/sepmtg>
[hereinafter September Transcript]. However, one member from the broadcast industry did
state his understanding that the NAB hierarchy opposed voluntary standards out of fear that
they would evolve into mandatory minimum standards. Id. at 47-49 (comments of Paul La
Camera).
325. Paige Albiniak, Preparing for Battle, BRDcsT. & CABLE, July 6, 1998, at 22.
326. Id.
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took no action regarding the Advisory Committee Report except to decideS327
to file comments. Before the meeting, an NAB staffer was quoted as
saying, "'The board may well decide that it's better off to say nothing
now,"' and to wait for the FCC and Congress to act.
As shown supra, having an organization that is willing to commit
adequate resources to self-regulation is essential to a successful self-
regulatory scheme. Here, the incentive for self-regulation, if any, comes
from the threat of government regulation. So, the question is whether the
broadcast industry's fear of government regulation provides sufficient in-
centive for it to engage in self-regulation.
Government regulation is certainly a real possibility here. The statute
permits broadcasters to receive, free of charge, the exclusive use of ex-
tremely valuable electromagnetic spectrum. Instead of being required to
bid for the spectrum in an auction, as many other spectrum licensees are,
the broadcasters are expected to serve the public interest. Thus, as a condi-
tion of using the spectrum, the broadcasters are required to do something
in the public interest. The only question is what that something is.
The Advisory Committee recommended (over the dissents of some
broadcast members) that the FCC impose some minimal public interest
standards, but it left the content of those standards up to the FCC.129 The
FCC is expected to initiate a rule making to determine what those public
interest standards will be in the spring of 1999.
It is not clear whether the FCC will propose, much less adopt, sig-
nificant public interest requirements for digital broadcasters. 330 If the FCC
proposes to adopt serious public interest requirements, the NAB may de-
cide that while it opposes a voluntary code, it opposes government-
mandated standards even more. From the broadcast industry's point of
view, the lesser of the two evils may well be the voluntary code.
On the other hand, the NAB is likely to opt for self-regulation only if
it can avoid or render insubstantial the FCC rules. If the FCC adopts seri-
ous public interest requirements for digital broadcasters, broadcasters will
have little incentive to engage in voluntary self-regulation. Thus, although
having both government regulation and industry self-regulation may pro-
327. Fox Still Undecided on Leaving NAB, Expresses Concerns, CoMM. DAILY, Jan. 14,
1999, at 6.
328. Networks Seek Repeal of NAB Endorsement of 35% Station Cap, COMM. DAILY,
Jan. 6, 1999, at2.
329. PIAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 47-48.
330. In an earlier rule making, the FCC put off this question. Advanced Television Sys-
tems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fifth Report & Or-
der, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, paras. 3-5, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 863 (1997). Since that time, the
composition of the FCC has changed.
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vide the best conditions for successful self-regulation, such a scenario
seems an unlikely outcome in this case.
Another reason why broadcasters may be less than enthusiastic about
embracing self-regulation relates to the structure of the video industry.
Since the period in which the old NAB Code was in effect, competition
from outside the broadcast industry has increased. Competition comes
primarily from cable television and somewhat from satellite television and
the Internet. The proposed code, however, would apply only to broadcast
digital television and not to other television delivery systems. To address
this problem, the group drafting the Model Voluntary Code suggested that
the Code should be applied to television programmers that are not broad-
casters.331 However, it seems doubtful that these other industries, which
unlike the broadcasters are not getting the benefit of valuable, free spec-
trum, have any incentive to adopt a similar code of conduct.
While the NAB may agree to self-regulation to avoid government
regulation, it is unlikely to commit the necessary resources to make self-
regulation effective. As demonstrated above, when the former Television
Code existed, little attention and few resources were devoted to enforcing
the program provisions compared to the advertising provisions. This may
have been in part due to the fact that program provisions were vague and
thus it was more difficult to evaluate compliance. Similarly, many of the
proposed provisions in the Model Code are vague and not easily measured
or enforced.332
Finally, even if the NAB adopts a code of conduct, its action may be
subject to constitutional challenge.333 To be sure, just because adoption of
the voluntary code is not truly voluntary does not necessarily mean that the• . 334
First Amendment would be violated. But it could cause delay and, as a
331. PIAC DRAFr CODE OF CONDuCr, supra note 316, at 3. See also September Tran-
script, supra note 324, at 41. However, this proposal does not appear in the final report.
332. For example, the Model Voluntary Code states that "news programming should be
both substantive and well-balanced" and should "provide appropriate coverage to topics of
particular concern to the local community." PIAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 108, 110. How-
ever, some provisions are more objective and quantifiable. For example, one provision
states that broadcasters should provide well over 75 public service spots per week. Id. at
110.
333. While presumably the NAB could not bring such a challenge, perhaps dissident
members or third parties might have standing to bring a constitutional challenge.
334. A First Amendment violation would only arise if government coerced industry to
do something indirectly that it could not require directly. While some of the proposed pro-
visions, if they were direct government regulations, might violate the First Amendment,
many would not. For example, the proposed children's television provision, see supra note
318, is similar to the Children's Television Act's requirement that each broadcaster provide
some programming serving the educational and informational needs, but is less specific
than the FCC's interpretation of that Act, which established a guideline of three hours of
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practical matter, the ultimate abandonment of the Code, as happened with
the Family Viewing Hour.
To avoid First Amendment difficulties, the Advisory Committee
notes that "it is extremely important that we are arguing on behalf of a
code as a simple recommendation to private organizations, above all the
NAB, and not as a proposed mandate from the government, either the FCC
or Congress. 335 The Report explains that the First Amendment is irrele-
vant where the industry as a whole decides what to broadcast without gov-
ernment involvement. However, "if a code were a product of government
threat, and were effectively required by government," the First Amend-
ment would apply, and the content regulation would be subject to scrutiny
by the courts.
It is difficult to take seriously the Advisory Committee's claim that
the code is purely voluntary. As discussed supra, digital broadcasters are
getting free use of valuable spectrum in return for serving the public inter-
est. Moreover, on its face, the proposed code would require the FCC to be
notified at license renewal time whether a station is in compliance with the
voluntary code. Broadcast licensees must seek renewal from the FCC
every eight years, and even though nonrenewa is extremely rare, no
broadcaster wants to risk a challenge to its license. Although the Model
Voluntary Code states that the notation as to compliance lacks any legal
force or effect, it is hard to imagine that the FCC would feel free to ignore
a finding of "continuing or egregious noncompliance.' '337 In sum, past ex-
perience with self-regulation of the media provides little hope that the Ad-
visory Committee's recommended voluntary code for digital television
will be successful.
D. Implications for Privacy on the Internet
There is also reason to be skeptical about the ability of self-regulation
to protect consumer privacy on the Internet. Despite numerous calls for
self-regulation, industry appears to be dragging its feet. Although the
White House first called for industry self-regulation in the Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce issued in July 1997, by November 1998,
only limited progress had been made. In its First Annual Report, the U.S.
children's educational programming per week. See supra Part mi.A.3.c(ii). Since neither the
Children's Television Act nor the FCC rules have been found unconstitutional, presumably
the broadcasters' decision to provide a reasonable amount of educational programming for
children would not violate the First Amendment, even if it were the result of government
coercion.
335. PIAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 117.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 114.
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Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, found that
"[i]ndustry was slow to respond to the President's call in the Framework
for the development of effective self-regulation. ' 338 It noted that since the
FTC published its Report to Congress in June 1998, however, serious ef-
forts to protect privacy through self-regulation had begun, citing as an ex-
ample, the efforts of the Online Privacy Alliance.339 But it warned that "if
self-regulation is to work, these efforts must expand over the next year.'3
40
Likewise, the FTC began calling for industry self-regulation at least
as early as the June 1996 workshop.?" In congressional testimony in July
1998, the Chairman of the FTC gave industry until the end of the year to
come up with effective self-regulation, or the FTC would seek legisla-
342 343tion. It does not appear that industry has met this challenge.
Although the government argues that it is in the economic interests of
business to develop effective self-regulation because "it is essential to as-
sure personal privacy in the networked environment if people are to feel
comfortable doing business online,"34 on balance, the economic incentives
probably run the other way.345 It is quite profitable for companies to collect
338. U.S. GOVERNMENT WoRING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT 16 (Nov. 1998), available at <http://www.ecommerce.gov> [hereinafter FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT]. See also Elizabeth deGrazia Blumenfeld, Privacy Please: Will the Inter-
net Industry Act to Protect Consumer Privacy Before the Government Steps In?, 54 Bus.
LAW. 349, 382 (1998).
339. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 338, at 16. According to its Web page,
www.privacyalliance.org, the Online Privacy Alliance is a coalition of over 60 global cor-
porations and associations, formed to "lead and support self-regulatory initiatives that create
an environment of trust and that foster the protection of individuals' privacy online and in
electronic commerce." Online Privacy Alliance, Mission (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.privacyalliance.org/mission/>. The Alliance has proposed privacy principles
and advocates an enforcement system based on a seal. Id.
340. FIRSTANNUALREPORT, supra note 338, at 17.
341. See Privacy Workshop, supra note 186, at 436 (closing statement of Chairman Pi-
tofsky), available at <http:llwww.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp96pw960605.pdf>.
342. Electronic Commerce Hearings, supra note 7, at 303 (statement of Robert Pitofsky,
Chairman, FTC); Jeri Clausing, Group Proposes Voluntary Guidelines for Internet Privacy,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 1998, at D4.
343. In February 1999, an FTC spokeswoman stated that the Commission would still
"'rather have industry regulate this than government."' Courtney Macavinta, Government
Delivers Privacy Ultimatum (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/
Textonly/0,25,31822,00.html>. The FTC plans a survey for March 1999 to determine the
industry's progress. Id.
344. Elements of Effective Self Regulation for the Protection of Privacy and Questions
Related to Online Privacy, Notice and Request for Public Comment, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,729
(NTIA 1998).
345. It has been reported that companies selling personal information had gross annual
revenues of $1.5 billion. Trans Union Corp., Initial Decision, FTC Docket No. 9255, at 53
n.354 (July 31, 1998), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/osl1998/ 9808/d9255pub.id.pdf>.
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personal information. It costs companies little to collect personal informa-
tion, and they can sell it or use it to better target their sales efforts.34 Self-
regulation that requires them to disclose their information practices and
allows the public to opt-out (or even worse from the industry point of
view, having to get them to opt-in) will increase the costs of information
collection.3 7
Thus, the major incentive for industry to self-regulate is to avoid the
threat of government regulation. Since there is no government agency that
currently has sufficient authority to regulate privacy, legislation would be
required. The possibility of legislation is not entirely remote. Both the
Administration and the FTC have threatened to seek legislation if the in-
dustry fails to self-regulate.348 Moreover, Congress did pass legislation to
protect children's privacy online.349 Nonetheless, the threat of legislation
may not be sufficiently realistic to overcome the obstacles to effective self-
regulation.
Even if the companies were to agree to a self-regulatory regime, it
may be difficult to enforce.35 0 All of the self-regulatory schemes being dis-
cussed rely on "notice and choice"; that is, the Web site would disclose its
privacy practices, and the consumer could exercise choice by declining or
continuing to do business with the company. One problem, however, is
that it is difficult for consumers to verify whether a company in fact com-
plies with its stated policies.3 11 Thus, it would be easy for companies to
346. See, e.g., Budnitz, supra note 30, at 853; Blumenfeld, supra note 338, at 351.
347. See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 32, at 108 (describing transaction costs involved in
opt-out); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REv.
1193, 1255 (1998) (noting that even disclosing the fact of collection is costly to firms).
348. Several academics have also called for legislative action to address privacy con-
cers. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 347, at 1193; Budnitz, supra note 30. Numerous bills
have been introduced in Congress that are related to privacy on the Internet. See generally
Electronic Privacy Information Center (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.epic.org>.
349. See supra note 8. However, it may be easier to get the political support needed for
legislation when the subject of the legislation is children and the number of companies af-
fected is smaller.
350. Professor Reidenberg has similarly argued that self-regulation has not been nor is it
likely to become a successful way to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens. See Joel R. Rei-
denberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
(forthcoming Apr. 1999).
351. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg & Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Perspectives on Privacy
27-28 (Oct. 29, 1998) (paper presented as part of the Information Privacy Seminar Series,
Georgetown University, January 1998) (discussing how actual information practices are
largely hidden from public view, and barriers for individuals to discover how businesses
use personal information are often insurmountable; at the same time, businesses profit
enormously from trade in personal information); Swire, supra note 12, at 6; Mary J. Cul-
nan, A Methodology to Assess the Implementation of the Elements of Effective Self-
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cheat and difficult for consumers to confirm compliance. Although the
Better Business Bureau is developing an enforcement mechanism that
352
would award a "privacy seal" to sites that meet its standards, there is no
reason to believe this enforcement mechanism would be any more effec-
tive than the old NAB seal.353 These problems would be aggravated by the
lack of government oversight since there is no government agency that
• . 354
clearly has authority to oversee privacy protection.
As in the case of digital television, self-regulation as an adjunct to
government regulation seems more promising. The safe harbor provisions
of the children's privacy legislation provide a useful model in this re-
gard.355 The safe-harbor approach would appear to shift some of the costs
of regulation to the private sector, while ensuring that all industry partici-
pants are subject to minimum standards. Likewise, this approach can allow
flexibility and take advantage of industry's superior knowledge, without
having to rely solely on industry self-interested choices. The ability of the
public to comment on the FTC rules and on the adequacy of industry
guidelines provides an additional safeguard against industry subversion of
self-regulation to its own ends.
Finally, the industry structure militates against effective self-
regulation. As Professor Budnitz notes,
meaningful regulation requires participation by the entire electronic
commerce industry. Unfortunately, the presence of great diversity in
this industry makes universal participation unlikely. In fact, in this
context, it is probably inaccurate to talk about the electronic commerce
industry in the singular, for several industries are involved.
356
Regulation for Protection of Privacy 11-12 (discussion draft June 1, 1998), available at
<http://www.georgetown.edu/culnan/>.
352. Macavinta, supra note 343.
353. Indeed, a recent press report illustrates one of the problems with seals. Trust-E is an
organization, funded by Microsoft and nine other companies, that monitors the Internet pri-
vacy policies of about 500 companies. Companies that meet the criteria are awarded a seal
of approval designed to assure consumers that their privacy will be protected. Although a
customer complained to Trust-E that Microsoft was collecting personally identifiable in-
formation even when customers explicitly indicated they did not want this information col-
lected, Trust-E declined to deny Microsoft the use of its seal or even to audit the company.
Watchdog Group Won't Pursue Microsoft, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, Mar. 23, 1999
(visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.mercurycenter.com/svtech/news/breaking/merc/docs/
009780.htm>.
354. It has been suggested that the FTC could initiate enforcement actions against com-
panies that post privacy disclosure policies yet fail to comply with them. However, apart
from the difficulties in determining whether companies are complying when they alone
know what they do with the information, the remedies are also inadequate for consumers.
Reidenberg & Schwartz, supra note 351, at 26-27.
355. See supra note 8.
356. Budnitz, supra note 30, at 874.
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No single industry organization comparable to the NAB exists that could
undertake self-regulation. Although the Online Privacy Alliance
"represents significant online players ... the group's membership is only
a drop in the bucket given the seemingly infinite number of sites on the
Web."35 7 Given the large number and diversity of parties involved, it is dif-
ficult to see how self-regulation could work.
V. CONCLUSION
Self-regulation has been portrayed as superior to government regula-
tion for addressing problems of new media such as digital television and
the Internet. This Article has analyzed the effectiveness of self-regulation
by looking at the track record of self-regulation in other media. After de-
scribing and analyzing past uses of self-regulation in broadcasting, chil-
dren's advertising, news, alcohol advertising, comic books, movies, and
video games, it concludes that self-regulation rarely lives up to its claims,
although in some cases, it has been useful as a supplement to government
regulation. It then identifies five factors that may account for the success
or failure of self-regulation. These include the industry incentives, the
ability of government to regulate, the use of measurable standards, public
participation, and industry structure. Applying these five factors to digital
television public interest responsibilities and privacy on the Internet, it
concludes that self-regulation is not likely to be successful in these con-
texts.
357. Macavinta, supra note 343.
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